The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is ranked by experts as one of the largest and most active intelligence agencies in the Middle East. And yet it has been shrouded in so much mystery that apart from the occasional revelations by the Iranian Resistance, little has ever been made public about its operations and functions. The MOIS is no ordinary intelligence agency. It has been behind most of the 450 acts of terrorism the Iranian regime has sponsored around the world since the 1980s. It has a vast network of companies and offices around the world that act as fronts for its illegal operations. It conducts its espionage activities and surveillance operations against Iranian dissidents on every continent. It is involved in the illegal procurement of arms and weapons of mass destruction technology and materials.

The notable exception to this came in 1998, when a series of gruesome murders of Iranian dissidents by MOIS “liquidators” blew the lid off an orgy of crime and murder that had been going on for more than a decade. The clerical leaders blamed all the criminal activities of the MOIS on its then-Deputy Minister Saeed Emami, who was later conveniently killed in prison. They thus prevented any leak of sensitive information about the MOIS operations, as this would have compromised the entire leadership of the Islamic Republic.

The MOIS is no ordinary intelligence agency. It has been behind most of the 450 acts of terrorism the Iranian regime has sponsored around the world since the 1980s. It has a vast network of companies and offices around the world that act as fronts for its illegal operations. It conducts its espionage activities and surveillance operations against Iranian dissidents on every continent. It is involved in the illegal procurement of arms and weapons of mass destruction technology and materials. On the domestic scene, it is the principal agency responsible for dealing with opposition groups and dissidents. Its hit squads abduct, torture and murder suspects at will, without any fear of punishment. In short, the MOIS is a murder conglomerate. The principal target of the MOIS, as its chiefs have publicly stated on many occasions, is the People’s Mojahedin Organization and the National Council of Resistance of Iran.

Principal targets of MOIS
The German security agency, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Bfv, wrote in its 1997 annual report, “One of the main tasks of the Iranian secret service is to keep an eye on Iranians living in Germany who oppose the regime. Its top priority is to keep surveillance on the People’s Mojahedin of Iran and their political arm, the National Council of Resistance.”

In its 1999 annual report, Bfv affirmed:

The principal objective of the Iranian secret service is still to fight the Iranian oppositionists. … the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) and its political wing, the NCRI, are still at the top of the Intelligence Ministry’s activities. To grapple against the activities of the opposition in exile, Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has established various cultural associations. These are cover agencies that work for MOIS and the Iranian regime. Other than this, MOIS tries to publish various publications, some in the name of those who introduce themselves as ex-members of the PMOI, in order to persuade the reader to retract from the organization.
For the purpose of cracking this organization, MOIS even encourages the supporters of PMOI or other Iranians to go to Iran to visit their families or to stay there. Then MOIS will talk to them directly and sometimes, with offering bribe or intimidating them or their families in Iran, will ask them to cooperate with the secret service and give the necessary information to this ministry.
 
The Bfv noted in its annual report in 2000:

“The Iranian opposition in exile in Germany is in the core of the surveillance activities of MOIS. Various organizations and groups … are systematically under surveillance and scrutiny of this service. Yet the principal target is the most active and the most militarized opposition group…  the PMOI and its political wing the NCRI who is working in an international level.
MOIS has apparently concentrated its efforts on defusing opposition groups and their political activities. In this respect MOIS resorts to leading and financing propaganda against NCRI including those voiced by previous opponents of the regime.
As in previous years the Iranian secret service tries to recruit active or ex-members of the opposition.”
“… Regarding the suggestions about recruiting new members put forward by the MOIS branch in the embassy in Berlin, the MOIS center in Tehran will make the final decision. The more lenient travel conditions between Germany and Iran provide fine facilities for MOIS to contact and recruit new agents.”

Arrest of mullahs’ spy
“The priority of those under surveillance of the Iranian secret service is for example given to the Iranian resistance group, the Mojahedin and NCRI. On 24/07/2001 an Iranian residing in Germany was arrested in Ofenbach suspected of working as an agent of the Iranian secret service, MOIS. He must have spied on Iranian dissidents residing in Frankfort under instructions of MOIS.”

The Bfv report in June 2002 stated:

“The exiled opposition in Germany is still in the core of the surveillance activity of Iran’s secret service, MOIS… MOIS, at present, is apparently focusing on defusing the opposition groups and their political activity. In this respect MOIS resorts to leading and financing propaganda against the opposition including those voiced by previous opponents of the regime. Like previous years Iran’s secret service tries to enlist active or ex- members of opposition groups. This, in many instances, is taking place with intimidation of them or their families who are living in Iran.”

Dutch Security Service
Dutch Interior Security Service (BVD) in its 1998 annual report wrote: “Still we see that Iranian secret service organizations are active in The Netherlands. The Iranian agents are determined to find members of opposition groups in order to destabilize their organizations. Especially considered are the present as well as past members of People’s Mojahedin. Iran’s secret service uses intimidation to obtain Iranians’ cooperation.”

“It has been observed that, in the past period, the control of Iran’s secret forces has been shifted to inside of Iran. Contacts are increasingly being made directly from Tehran and/or by secret service officers who introduce themselves as, for example, businessmen.” In the succeeding year BVD reported: “Mojahedin-e Khalgh (PMOI), Iran’s most important opposition organization has representative in The Netherlands…in the west Mohjahedin’s activities are limited to arranging demonstrations and providing written and oral information.”

“… Iranian officials are still confronting the opposition group with severity. An important job of Iran’s secret service organizations is tracing and enlisting the opposition members abroad, especially past and present members of MEK (PMOI).”

“Iran’s secret activities are usually administered from inside Iran. If necessary they use traveling secret agents. Iranians living in Europe are ordered to take actions that harm the opposition groups and destabilize them. One method used is printing and distribution of literature harming a particular opposition organization...”

BVD wrote in its year 2000 report: “… Iranian statesmen act harshly against the opposition groups. Most of their attention is directed towards ex-supporters of PMOI.”

“Iran’s secret service administers its tasks not only under cover of usual diplomatic means but also increasingly from inside of Iran. In this respect, they use secret service officers and those living abroad. These agents must attack and harm the Iranian opposition instantly.”

The BVD noted in its 2001 report:

“Including in the duties of MOIS is the tracing and recognition of persons who have contacts with the opposition groups abroad. Supporters of the most important group i.e. Mojahedin-e Khalgh, are more then anyone else, and particularly, subject of attention of Iran’s secret service. The Ministry of Intelligence tries to collect as much information about this organization as possible through “ex-members of the Mojahedin”. Also, the agents of MOIS are instructed to distribute negative information about PMOI and its members. In this way, they attempt to weaken the organization and, in order to end their social and political movements, strive to portray a satanic view of the Mojahedin in host countries.

Testimony of Dutch Ministers of Justice and Interior
Following the publication of a number of allegations against the Mojahedin and the Iranian Resistance in the Netherlands, many members of the parliament asked the Interior Minister and the Minister of Justice about this subject:
Questions:
1- Are you aware of the article written in DeVolkskrant on April 28?
2- What is your opinion and assessment of the allegations of Karim Haghi (a former member of the organization) about Mojahedin’s activities in The Netherlands, which according to him has elevated itself to a Mafia organization whose tasks include smuggling people and collecting donations through forgery and intimidation of opponents?
3- Does the government have any other information about Mojahedin’s possible illegal moves in The Netherlands?
4- Is the government supporting further investigation into the roots of Mojahedin’s movements in The Netherlands and, if necessary, protecting Mojahedin’s opponents like Haghi, or not?

Answers:
To 1st question: “yes”.
To 2nd and 3rd questions: “If such move or document exists in The Netherlands, it has not yet been shown to police or the Judiciary, put aside the complaint about theft that has been brought up by Karim Haghi on March 9, 1999 and his article in …?... on April 28, 1999.”
“Mojahedin are known in The Netherlands as an organization that administers peaceful demonstrations. It is also apparent that they collect contributions in the streets under an affiliated charity called SIM. In that respect there has been some confrontations bases of which relates to the way the collectors deal with the people to boost the giving. But there is no record or document indicating that Mojahedin are smuggling people or commit other serious illegal actions like a Mafia organization.
Answer to Question 4: “We will do this when facts or the situation drag us into this matter. Mojahedin are under surveillance of Dutch secret service. Any information about Mojahedin’s unwanted moves, found by BVD, will be given to relevant bodies.

Police investigates Iran’s secret agents:
Early in the year 2000, after the escalation of activities of the agents of MOIS in various western countries, the police in these countries interviewed many of them and warned them against their relations with the mullahs’ Ministry of Intelligence.
At the same time Karim Haghi issued a statement under the name of a society called “Peyvand” (an association established by agents of Ministry of Intelligence in The Netherlands) excerpts of which are as follows: “Tuesday, 1 February 2000, an agent of Dutch secret service arrived at Karim Haghi’s place in Elst and … after initial talks started reading names from a list in his hand which included Messrs: 1- Bani-Sadr 2- Alireza Nourizadeh 3- Bahman Niroomand 4- Khajeh-Nouri 5- Parviz Yaghoobi 6- Khanbaba Tehrani 7- Mehdi Khoshhal 8- Asghar Barzoo (Sweden) 9- Bahman Rastgoo (Germany) 10- Jaafar Baghalnejad (Norway) 11- Hassan Khalaj (Norway) 12- Aabed Haj Esmaili (England) 13- Hadi Shams Haeri (Holland) 14- Ghassem (Mohammad Tofigh Assadi, Holland) 15- Hassan Alijani (US) 16- Karim Haghi (Holland) and Mrs Nadereh Afshari (Germany) … The secret agent added that there are more names that he cannot read for difficulty of pronunciation, and that’s why he stopped at that level. He also added that all of you are in contact with the Iranian regime and have formed a large network… you must tell us who else is in contact with the regime … we have enough information about your relations with the regime and know that your publication is being financed by the regime. We also know that Mr Shams Haeri is in touch with the regime and his contact with the Ministry of Intelligence is his brother. In this respect, too, he has traveled to Singapore once. Mr Parviz Yaghoobi, in France, is also in touch with the Iranian regime… we want The Netherlands calm and do not like to have demonstrations and fighting here. It is best for you to abandon this sort of work at once and go after a normal life and think of your children’s future. We know that you hate the Mojahedin and they have caused you damage and ruined your life and future… On the same day another secret agent was present at the parking lot near the workplace of Mrs Roya Roodsaz, Karim Haghi’s wife, and when she was about to get on her car he introduced himself and told her that he intends to talk to her. The core of the talks was about Karim Haghi’s activities and where the funds for Peyvand publication were coming from. The secret agent told her that Karim and his friends have formed a large network all of whom are in touch with the regime. Karim has once traveled to Cyprus…” 
“At the same time two police cars followed another friend who had taken Mr Haj Esmaili to a train station. When Haj Esmaili gets on the train a person approaches him and starts asking similar questions.”
“Simultaneously in three German cities, Cologne, Wiesbaden and Hannover, 6 people in groups of two approach Mehdi Khoshhal and Bahman Rastgoo and Mrs Naderh Afshari and ask about the type of communication and the circulation number of Peyvand publication, sources of its finance and … Also, in the first week of February, Messrs Shams Haeri and Mohammad Reza Eskandari and his wife Tahereh Khorrami were subjected to questions and answers. On February 9, two Dutch secret agents contacted Alireza Mohseni in The Netherlands and other than the names listed above ask him about his contacts with Fereydoon Gilani…”

NCRI’s Commission on Security and Counter-terrorism issued a statement on 15 February: “… in recent weeks, police and security bodies in The Netherlands, Germany, England, Sweden, Norway, Canada and … have engaged in calling on a number of regime’s agents and warning them.”

“As the agents of the mullahs’ secret service have reported to their superiors in various embassies as well as to the headquarters in Tehran, police has undeniable evidence like photographs and tapes of conversations of these agents with their contacts in Ministry of Intelligence. Police, also with detailed information, is aware of secret travels of these agents to Iran and other neighboring countries as well as movements of a number of them to Far East countries, like Malaysia and Singapore, back and force, in order to meet the representatives of the Intelligence Ministry. Likewise they are aware of travels of a number of these agents to Europe and America in recent months and also know about the expenses paid by Iran’s secret service. In some cases even amount of weekly or monthly wage and method of payment is known to the police.”
In addition, police and intelligence organizations have been informed that mullahs’ Intelligence Ministry has given instructions to such agents as to the framework in which they should respond to calls from the police and other legal agencies and how to defend themselves under the pretext of “democratic rights”.
… Police is aware of Karim Haghi’s relations with the Intelligence Ministry since 1994 as well as his trips to Cyprus and Malaysia and meetings with representatives of mullahs’ Intelligence Ministry. And they know that he facilitated sending Bahador Khorrami to Iran. (Bahador is an 11-year-old child who was tricked away from his legal guardian in Canada, by a gang from the Intelligence Ministry, and transferred to The Netherlands where he was kept illegally for some time and then kidnapped by this criminal gang and taken to Iran in secret).
1- According to security police in The Netherlands, Ministry of Intelligence, using Karim Haghi, has tried to establish a network of its agents. Police has numerous photographs of Karin Haghi with official and recognized elements of the Ministry. Distribution of the publication called Peyvand, fully paid for by Ministry of Intelligence, also relates to this matter.
According to police’s information, the Ministry of Intelligence is paying those involved in this publication, whose names the police has in a list.
Haghi has used an Iranian passport with the first name of Mahmood, with German visa, for his travels. The Ministry of Intelligence in many instances uses Karim Haghi’s wife (Roya Roodsaz) for contacting him. Haghi, also, sends his wife to Tehran to deliver “sensitive reports” and to take “special instruction” from his contacts. One of his contacts in the Ministry is a torturer called Naseri. He is one of the two who, after the arrest of Hamid Khorsand  were commissioned to arrange his freedom in whatever way possible.
Police is aware that Shams Haeri, through a close relative in Iran, is in touch with the Ministry of Intelligence. He was sent to Singapore to visit a representative of the Ministry and is considered one of the active members of the network.
- Police is also aware of a trip by Haj Esmaili to Singapore in order to visit the representatives of the ministry as well as the dollars he received from them. Record of ignominious cooperation of Haj Esmaili with torturers of the mullahs’ intelligence and embassies in England and The Netherlands has been widely revealed, such that other agents of the mullah’s intelligence abroad are trying to cover it up. Haj Esmaili is the same agent that before printing, in Mojahed publication, of a letter with his own handwriting and signature in which he had explicitly acknowledged that, he only had studied up to second grade in high school, the mullahs’ Intelligence Ministry was trying to use him as a well established opponent of the regime with the title “Mr Engineer Abed Haj Esmaili, one of ex-leaders of the Mojahedin”. Haj Esmaili, in several instances, has received thousands-dollar wages from the Intelligence Ministry. He went to The Netherlands some time ago and resided in Karim Haghi’s home. Simultaneously, Hassan Alijani also went to The Netherlands from the US and they held joint meetings with other agents and representatives of the Intelligence Ministry.
- In Germany too, the security police approached Ali Akbar (Bahman) Rastgoo, Mehdi Khoshhal and Nadereh Afshari, and told them of their knowledge of the details of their relations with the Ministry of Intelligence. For instance they had a question and answer session with Rastgoo about the funds he receives from the ministry for his cooperation with Peyvand publication.
- For preserving, protecting, and boosting the moral of its exposed agents who are in fierce fright and nervousness, the Intelligence Ministry has outlined the following instructions:
First - Promote your relations with each other and exchange your experiences in dealing with police and the type of questions they ask. So that when the police approached anyone, he/she would be able to answer.
Second – Spread everywhere that this is a plot by the Mojahedin and their words trying to halt your activities.
Third – Spread everywhere that this move by the police is an international plot in order to close our mouths.
Fourth – Tell Nourizadeh, Bani-Sadr and Khanbaba Tehrani and others who have supported you in the past. They will help you.

It is interesting that each and every one of these agents are trying to repudiate police documents and deny their relations with mullahs’ Intelligence agencies.

Those who are actively engaged in the mullahs’ dirty campaign against the Mojahedin abroad are from several origins. The common denomination for all of them is that they are now working for the mullahs’ Intelligence Ministry.

The first group consists of those who have been agents of the Intelligence Ministry or Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guards Corps and had gone to Iraq to infiltrate into the ranks of the Mojahedin and the National Liberation Army of Iran.

As we will also refer to in next chapters, following the exposition of their mission the Mojahedin released these individuals after completing their investigations and they were returned to where they came from. The Intelligence Ministry dispatched some of these people on new missions abroad upon their return to Iran. This time they introduced themselves as former members of the Mojahedin who were subjected to torture and persecution and then forced back to Iran. They now claim to have fled Iran and are applying for asylum in other countries. They pretend that they are being threatened by both Iran and the Mojahedin. Mohammad Hossein Sobhani, Farhad Javaheri-yar, Hassan Sadeqian, Edward Termadoyan are among them.

The second group are those who were at one time within the ranks of the Resistance and left the Resistance due to its hardship and subsequently were recruited by the Intelligence Ministry. The unabated struggle by the Mojahedin against two dictatorships has attracted hundreds of thousands as members and active supporters. According to the regime’s officials some half a million were recruited by the Mojahedin Organization in Iran in early 1980s.1  On the course of such a harsh struggle where 120,000 have been executed, some of the individuals do not have the tolerance to continue and depart from this course. This is the mechanism which is applied to any resistance movement to attract or detract, in particular when dealing with the most brutal dictatorship in contemporary era.

Over the years many people left the ranks of resistance to lead an ordinary life. The vast majority of these people remained as supporters of the resistance movement and continue backing within their capacity. Many of them have reacted to the Intelligence Ministry’s propaganda against the Mojahedin and have even published books in response to false information spread against the Mojahedin, in particular on the issue of mistreatment or discontent of former members. But some of them were recruited to the Intelligence Ministry by threats or enticement. Mercenaries like Karim Haqi, Mohammad Reza Eskandari and Shams Haeri are among this group.

Elaborating on these people in the book entitled “Iran: State of Terror” published by the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Lord Eric Avebury wrote: “Another method is using the small number of defectors who had at one stage cooperated with opposition organizations and individuals. These persons, due to their low or non-existent motivation to continue the struggle and maintain their principles, allowed themselves to be bought by the regime at a later stage. Such people have so far provided the regime’s terrorists in Europe with the most extensive intelligence and political services. In addition to providing information on the assassination targets to the regime, they prepare the political grounds for the murders of the dissidents by spreading propaganda against the individuals or organizations they had previously cooperated with, defaming them and accusing them of being worse than the ruling regime.” 2

Mullah Dori Najafabadi, Khatami's first Minister of Intelligence said on the issue: "The Intelligence Ministry supports Mojahedin turncoats." 3

The third group are those who have never been in the Mojahedin Organization. For example, a man by the name of Bahman Rastgou, residing in Germany, has been serving the mullahs Intelligence Ministry as “a former member of the Mojahedin” but he has never been even among the active members of the Mojahedin.

The last group consists of some unfortunate and politically bankrupt individuals who have been living abroad for decades but now, for their living or for return to mullahs or in fear of terrorist acts of the regime, have opted to cooperation with the Intelligence Ministry against the Mojahedin..

Exposed infiltrators
Mohammad Hossein Sobhani – Sobhani is an Intelligence Ministry agent who was sent to Iraq to infiltrate the Mojahedin. But now that he has sought asylum in Germany and claims that he was ‘a senior member of the Mojahedin but when he criticized the strategy and ideology of the Mojahedin he was put in jail and after several years was sent to Iraqi jails and later, having served in Iraqi prisons, he was exchanged for Iraqi POWs and handed over to the Iranian regime. But he succeeded to escape from the Iranian prison and came to Europe.’
Sobhani is one of several Intelligence Ministry agents who have entered Europe within a short period in Spring of 2002 using similar scenarios as described above. Ardeshir Parhizkari, Hamireza Barhoun and Farhad Javaheri-yar are among these people.

Of course anyone who has even a little knowledge of prisons in Iran, would know very well that in the past two decades the number of political prisoners who have managed to escape has not exceeded a handful. In light of this fact, how can it be possible that within a period of two months several political prisoners, specially the ones who according to themselves have been handed over by the Mojahedin to Iraqi authorities and by Iraqis to the Iranian regime, been able to escape from the prison. This is something which no one with a sane mind would believe.

The Counter-terrorism Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran issued a statement at the time declaring: “Mohammad Hossein Sobhani who 3 years ago, after exposure of his relations with the regime , fled the Mojahedin bases only to be arrested by Iraqi forces and who finally made his way to Iran legally, has recently been sent to Germany by the Ministry of Intelligence. He has established relations with other agents of the MOIS and has been recommended to pretend having been a prisoner of the regime who has fled the mullahs' tyranny by some sort of sophisticated scheme and secretly made  his way to Germany!” 5

On June 11, 2002, a month and half later, the Intelligence Ministry’s Internet Site, Mahdis, hastily placed an interview with this agent to claim that although he was returned to Iran from Iraq on January 21, 2002, he escaped following a clash and a shoot out in Tehran and fled Iran to Europe in March 2002.

But what is the reality? In a report by the Directorate of the Counter Intelligence of the NLA which was published in Mojahed weekly no. 592 on July 2, 2002, we read: “Mohammad Hossein Sobhani, was a member of the mullahs’ army who was assigned in February 1983 to infiltrate into the Mojahedin in Kurdistan and then reach the Mojahedin from Kurdistan. He was first deployed in logistical bases and from February 1990 to Autumn 1991 was a member of protection team for transportation (Inside the PMOI or while still working with the regime). But due to a suspicion on his state, he never managed to gain the trust of his colleagues. Once, in 1986, his commander, Fereydoun Varmazyari raises doubts about him which lead to taking his rifle from him. In the regime’s conspiracy to assassinate of the leader of the resistance in 1992, his suspicious links and false past records and treacherous service to the Intelligence Ministry was unveiled. The news of the assassination plot against the leader of resistance was announced on March 18, 1992. Its details are as follows, on December 23, 1991 the terrorist-diplomats of the mullahs’ regime were expecting the arrival of Massoud Rajavi near the central office of the Mojahedin in Baghdad. But thr Mojahedin pre-empted and the following day the AFP and the Reuters reported that the Iranian regime announced that two of its diplomats in Baghdad have been seriously wounded by the Mojahedin. Subsequently on March 18, 1992, the regime’s radio and television hastily reported that the Intelligence Ministry had announced, ‘Rajavi was assassinated by his guards.’ Apparently the code sent to Tehran had stated ‘not assassinated’ but the mullahs’ intelligence uncoded it by mistake as ‘assassinated’.

“17 days later, the regime tried to retaliate by bombing Ashraf Camp and sent 13 Phantom bombers and dropped 30 tons of bombs mainly over the command headquarters. But they failed yet again. At that time, another regime’s agent by the name of Kazem Soleimani reported that he personally saw with his own eyes the death of Fahimeh Arvani, Maryam Rajavi and Massoud Rajavi. On pursuing investigations, the Mojahedin found out more about the role of information given by the traitor defectors and infiltrators and the suspicious links between Mohammad Hossein Sobhani and his brother, Ja’afar Sobhani in ‘educational affairs’ and another Revolutionary Guard, in Evin Prison.” 6

In 1999, Sobhani ran away from the NLA to cross the border into Iran, but he was arrested by Iraqi authorities and subsequently sent to Iran with a legal process in 2002. The Intelligence Ministry sent him to Europe after he was briefed again.

Two senior officials of the Intelligence Ministry by the names of Haj Gholami and Haj Saeed were responsible for their training and preparations. In a letter by another agent named Ramin Darami to “dear brother Haj Saeed” on February 20, 2002, he wrote: “After we entered Iran through legal channels, we were sent to Marmar Hotel in Tehran and were given a high level reception. While we were in Marmar Hotel, the head of our team was brother Mohammad Hossein Sobhani and others in our group were Ali Qashqavi and Taleb Jalilian. Our brothers from the Intelligence (Ministry) paid us daily visits and resolved any problems we had and during this period I spoke to Haj Mahmoud… my stay in the hotel lasted ten days…during the period we stayed in Marmar Hotel, your proposed plans were reviewed several times by brother Mohammad Hossein Sobhani within our team and briefed on that.” 7

Unprecedented testimony
- Mahmoud Massoudi who was in contact with the Intelligence Ministry for seven years unveiled a plot by the Intelligence Ministry against the Mojahedin in a letter address to Mr. Ruud Lubers, UN High Commissioner for Refugees.8 In his letter he referred to Sobhani and wrote: “On May 8, Alireza Nourizadeh (an agent who operates under the cover of a journalist) contacted me and said: “A number of new people from the Mojahedin have come, some of whom were with the Mojahedin as recently as six months ago.” He referred to Adham Tayebi (nicknamed Massoud) and said: “These people have come with documents to prove that the Mojahedin have been doing operational work and spying for Iraq and plan to launch a major tribunal to prove that the Mojahedin are terrorists.”
- “In the next step I found out that in February and March Karim Haqi and other elements within the Intelligence Ministry network discussed an imminent plan by the Intelligence Ministry to bring a number of people from Iran to Europe (under the name of discontent members and officials of the Mojahedin) with people like Abolhassan Bani-Sadr (in France), Mehdi Khanbaba Tehrani, Bahman Niroumand and Mansur Bayatzadeh (in Germany) and a number of others to help those who were to come and provide them letters to support their asylum application.”
- “Karim Haqi was assigned to tell the above mentioned people that in view of the information these new comers will recount about the “human rights violations” by the Mojahedin, “Rajavi’s crimes” and “Mojahedin’s prisons” in Iraq, we should be able to launch an international tribunal against the Mojahedin. These individuals, in particular Bani-Sadr and also Nourizadeh gave their assurances. Of course, according to my own personal experience and others who have defected from the Mojahedin and at the moment lead an ordinary life in Europe, the claims by individuals like Sobhani, Javaheri Yar and Adham Tayebi (another Intelligence Ministry agent sent to Norway) against the Mojahedin were not believable and I knew that allegations like “torture” and “imprisonment and murder of innocent people” have been used by the Islamic Republic regime against its main opposition for years.
- Nourizadeh has been in active and constant contact with the dispatched agents by the Intelligence Ministry. Sobhani’s interview with the Persian section of BBC radio was arranged by him and according to his own stipulation, all the interviews by Adham Tayebi with one Farsi language radio program allocated to Nourizadeh and its caster is Meibodi, were fully arranged by him.”
- “While emphasizing on the need to support and give any help to those dispatched by the Intelligence Ministry of the Islamic Republic, he strongly welcomed a proposal for a face to face talk with Sobhani and asked me to make an interview with Sobhani to be printed in Rouzegare Now monthly (which he has recently bought with the money he received from the mullahs’ regime). He said he will pay for all the expenses related to this interview including the trip to city of Doublin in Germany (where Sobhani lived).”
“Subsequently Sobhani contacted me after talking to Nourizadeh and receiving his advices and emphasize and expressed his readiness for the interview. I was told to take some photographs from him with intellectual-looking postures to be published together with the interview. With a prior arrangement, I went to Doblin on July 30 and spoke to him face to face for 8 hours and also recorded a 40 minute interview on a cassette. In this meeting which was from eight in the morning to four o’clock in the afternoon, I found out about a lot of things concerning the recent mobilization by the Intelligence Ministry against the Mojahedin and the Iranian Resistance.”
- “The scenario for the agent of the Intelligence Ministry of the Islamic Republic in brief was that he was one of the officials of “the Mojahedin’s political security office” and he was “imprisoned and tortured” by the Mojahedin for his “opposition to the organization’s policies” and he was handed over to the Iraqi authorities after several years of solitary by the Mojahedin. After several years in jail in Iraq he was handed over to Iran and put in prison by the Intelligence Ministry. He escaped the Intelligence Ministry jail on his third day of arrival in Iran and came to Germany.”
- “Sobhani never explained how he managed to escape from prison in Iran and responded to all my questions on this issue with smiles and jokes. He wanted to insinuate that why I was asking questions about something which I was  already aware of.”
“It is interesting that I asked a number of other claimants of opposition and those who introduced themselves as “former members of the Mojahedin” about the way Sobhani, Javaheri Yar and others escaped the Intelligence Ministry’s jail and they had no answer either and said that it is not so important, the important matter are the things they say against the “Rajavi’s sect.””
- “While he claimed that he had ran away from the Intelligence Ministry after three days, at the same time he had read all the books and booklets by the Intelligence Ministry published in recent years under the name of defectors from the Mojahedin against the Mojahedin. The books are used in two cases by the Ministry. The ones used abroad for external use and those for training Intelligence Ministry infiltrators in safe houses and hotels under the control of the intelligence in Tehran.”
“It is obvious that it was not possible to read these kinds of books and booklets in the Mojahedin and in Iraqi prisons, therefore, Sobhani should have read dozens of books within three days. This is while, according to his claim, during these three days he was under torture or being transferred from Qasre Shirin prison to Kermanshah prison and from there to a prison in Tehran.”
- “Sobhani stressed that his “mission” abroad was to campaign against the Mojahedin and Mr. Massoud Rajavi personally, and the most important matter is to attack Mr. Rajavi. He also said that he was responsible for the organization of “Mojahedin defectors” who are “running away” from Iran.”
- “On July 30 he told me that two others, one of whom was based in Germany, are to make revelations against the Mojahedin in the near future and emphasized that their statements were with him and he has made the final modifications on them and the time for their release will be determined by him and no one else.”
- “Sobhani said that Adham Tayebi had discussed his statement against the Mojahedin with him before releasing it and he had already told him the necessary points to be included in his statement and advised him to concentrate on “Eternal Light Operation – 2” (REF) and prevention of a major Mojahedin operation and try to activate the families of those who were in the NLA and Iran-Iraq border region, in Europe against the Mojahedin, under the pretext of fear for the lives of their relatives.”
- “He clearly considers himself as a supporter of Rafsanjani and the line followed by him during his presidency but asked me not to mention this in the interview.”
- “Sobhani said that “Rafsanjani was ‘father of reform in Iran’ and believed that the activities of the Mojahedin inside Iran on one hand and ‘extremist measures’ of a section of Khatami’s faction on the other, led to Rafsanjani’s failure and isolation. For this, he was extremely upset about the Mojahedin.”
- “Sobhani explained that Bani Sadr, Khan Baba Tehrani, Bahman Niroumand and Farrokh Nagahdar had active contacts with him and helped him. Bahman Niroumand and Bani Sadr had given him letters in support of application for asylum. These letters were supplied by Karim Haqi and his associates.”
- “He stipulated that “I determine how much information should be given and to whom. For instance I have given Karim Haqi, Shams Haeri and Nourizadeh the names of two others among the ones who have newly arrived (in Europe) who are to announce their position in a near future. But I will determine as to when they should go public and make public announcements and no one should say anything anywhere and release their names without my approval of it.” He added: “Karim Haqi and Shams Haeri have an executive role but the text of statements are my responsibility and I will announce them when the time comes.””
- “I asked him about “Eternal light operation” that “in case of a US attack on Iraq, the Mojahedin will attack Iran” which has been raised recently in some of the sites quoting “Mojahedin defectors.” In response he said: “I was one of those who raised this first and then the others repeated it. He explained that this was solely intended to burn the possibility of a major operation by the Mojahedin against the Islamic Republic.””
- “In the interview which I was recording, he tried not to reveal his supportive position towards the regime very much. For instance, while in his interview he was dividing the blame for suppression, torture and killings by the mullahs between the Mojahedin and the mullahs, in private, he was like the officials of the regime blaming the Mojahedin and other opponents of the regime for massacres and tragedies committed by the regime.”
- “In one word, following hours of discussion and many pursuant telephone calls to him, it was absolutely clear to me that he was neither a political asylum seeker nor a defector seeking an ordinary life, but a trained agent dispatched by the Intelligence Ministry of the Islamic Republic with a strong financial backing and contacts and according to him: “Here, that is abroad, he has no other aim but to fight against the Mojahedin and he is assigned to nothing but countering them.””

In parts of his interview with Massoudi which was published in the Mojahed publication no. 599 dated August 22, Sobhani openly supported Khatami and the “reformist” movement which started since the election of Khatami. He stressed that, “Peaceful campaign and methods of reformist campaign, and since May 23, 1997 (when Khatami was elected as president for the first time) and even from present juncture, is a legitimate campaign and will work, will bear results and will be in the interest of all Iranians.” He endorsed Khatami and said: “The reform movement of Iranian people is now moving forward. The movement and its pace forward may slow down or take speed and have its ups and downs, but I believe this movement is going ahead and as it is moving forward, we ought to support it.”

“Dissident” Mojahedin

Upon his dispatch to Europe by the Intelligence Ministry, Sobhani released two lists of discontent members of the Mojahedin who were either in Abu Ghoreib prison in Iraq or handed over to the Iranian regime. The Intelligence Ministry’s list consisted of 81 names which is a combination of the ministry’s agents, POWs and those who had returned to Iran through legal channels or their personal efforts to start ordinary lives in Iran. Among them were also some ordinary criminals, detained smugglers in Iraq and people who had entered Iraq illegally.

A number of names in this list were indicated only by first names like Manouchehr, Alireza, Hassan, Amir and ***… by which hundreds of people could be found within the Mojahedin. On the other hand there were some names which were completely unknown for the Mojahedin and there had never been anyone by those names in the Mojahedin or the NLA according to the investigation of relevant bodies in the Mojahedin Organization and the NLA. But the rest of the people in the list are as follows and competent international bodies are aware of them:

1- Seven of these people, Farhad  Bash’areh (no. 19), Mohammad Baqer Mo’menzadeh (no. 23) Jalaladin Eskandari (no. 13), Shahmorad Zare’ei (no. 26), Mohsen Hashemi (no. 21), Fariborz Derikband (no. 32 of the second list) and Borzou Rezaii (no. 44 from second list), are Intelligence Ministry infiltrators who were exposed by Mojahed publication no. 380 on March 2, 1998, which was five years earlier. At that time too, after they were indentified, they were expelled from the NLA without any punishment.

2- Ten of the above list are infiltrators whose names were published in Mojahed publication no. 592 quoting a report by the Counter-intelligence Directorate of the NLA on July 2, 2002. They are: Farhad Javaheri Yar (47), Ramin Darami (40), Ali Ashrafi Amin (35), Taleb Jalilian (4), Mohsen Rasoulizadeh (no. 20 of list 1), Mohammad Hossein Sobhani (48), Rostam Abdulvand (28), Iraj Atrian (18), Ali Qashqavi (45) and Rashid Moradi (12).  These people were infiltrators of the Intelligence Ministry who were sent to Iraq to murder members of the Mojahedin but they were identified. The names and their admissions was published in Mojahed publication no. 592.

3- One these people by the name of Rashid Moradi [his original name is Majid Karami] (no. 12 of list 1) was arrested in November 2001 in a hotel in Baghdad by the Police for ordinary crimes which had nothing to do with the Mojahedin. In the meantime, investigations by the Mojahedin inside Iran revealed that he had been working for the Intelligence Ministry since 1997 and he had tipped off the Intelligence Ministry to a number of Mojahedin supporters who wanted to join the NLA.

4- Fifteen of these people were former Iran-Iraq war POWs who have nothing to do with the Mojahedin. This is an issue which can be pursued through the International Committee of the Red Cross to obtain the facts. The names of these 15 individuals are: Sadeq Baroutian (no. 5 of list 2), Elias tir (no. 7 of list 2), Beidollah Jahani (no. 9 of list 2), Esmail Maaroufi (no. 11 of list 2), Assad Pak (no.20), Gholam-Hossein Qassemi (no. 22), Hosseinali Alizadeh (no. 24), Touraj Rokhzadi (no. 31), Abdul-Majid Abdullahi (no. 39), Ali-Akbar Amin Abbassi (no. 41), Jahangir Samani (no. 43), Kamal Fazlali (no. 46), Alireza [Batmanqelij] (no. 25), Edvard Termodian [Christian] (no. 38) and Abulfazl [Mirkani] (no. 37).

5- The names of a number of ordinary criminals detained in Iraq were included in these two lists who had no relations with the Mojahedin. 13 of these people are: Behnam Behzadi (no. 4 of list 1), Behnam Godarzi (no. 5 of list 1), Jamshid [sun of Eskandar] (no. 10 of list 1), Jaafar Hossein [from the city of Rasht] (no. 14 of list 1), Hamid [known as Hamid Afghani] (no. 9 of list 1), Mohsen Parsa (no. 22 of list 1), Manuchehr Beheshti (no. 28 of List 1), Shahmorad Namdar (no. 31 of list 1), Hassan [from Eastern Azarbaijan province] (no. 33 of list 1), Rassoul Sanjaqi (no. 8 of list 2), Khaledeh Hashemizadeh (no. 16 of list 2), Hassan Mousavi (no. 2 of list 2) and Safa Abdulrahman (no. 27 of list 2).

6- Ninteen of these people in the list of the Intelligence Ministry were those who were sent to Iran on their own requests with financial and technical assistance of the Mojahedin. Ashraf Baz-sefid-par (no. 2 of list 1), Akbar Akbarzadeh (no. 3 of list 1), Hamid Dehdari (no. 8 of list 1), Rassoul Mohammad Nejad (no. 11 of list 1), Abbass Yazdani (no. 15 of list 1), Aziz Assadi (no. 16 of list 1), Ali Rezazadeh (no. 17 of list 1), Ali Sorkhian (no. 18 of list 1), Mahmoud Alinaqi (no. 25 of list 1), Mostafa Ghanimati-Fard (no. 27 of list 1), Mohsen Parsapour (no. 22 of list 1), Akbar She’erbaf (no. 1 of list 2), Habib Aliasgharpour (no 12 of list 2), Jamshid Pourjam (no. 14 of list 2), Touraj Mahmoud Kelaye (no. 34 of list 2), Seyyed Hassan Sharifi (no. 26 of list 2), Jaafar Hosseini (no. 14 of list 1) and Hassan Sadeqian (no. 10), Hamidreza Barhoun (no. 23). Hand-written requests of these individuals with their signatures are enclosed. (Enclosed where)

7- Individuals like Mahmoud Zolfaqari (no. 24 of list 1), Arkan Ahmadi (no. 1 of list 1) and Manouchehr (no. 32 is probably Manouchehr Hosseini) approached admission center of the NLA but were refused for lack of necessary qualifications (immorality, political, security or lack of mental balance). In the above lists they were mainly referred to as “defectors of the Mojahedin Organization.” In Sobhani’s list we read: “Someone by the name of Bahram Khajavi committed suicide in Rajavi’s prison and set fire to himself in 1998 who was kept in solitary confinement. I have precise information that he has been in Rajavi’s solitary since 1988. He is from Kermanshah and is about 37 to 38 years of age and 1.75m height. His face has been deformed as a result of burning.” But the fact is that Bahram Khajavi left the Mojahedin 10 years ago and returned to Pakistan. The receipt for the sum of 180,000 towmans as financial help paid to Bahram Khajavi and his farewell and thanking letter for the help given by the Mojahedin Organization on the day he left for Pakistan 10 years ago is available.

Sobhani’s companions
Ardeshir Parhizkari: He arrived in Iraq in February 1989 from Turkey and joined the Mojahedin. He became a member of the organization in 1995. He pretended to be suffering from paralyses when he was called for security check before going to an operation. But the specialist physicians rejected his claim after carrying out tests (letter by a specialist is available). But despite this, maximum care was taken and several people looked after him. He had special interest to collect information, in particular to have access to command headquarters through suspicious communication systems. In 1998 when he felt that he is being considered as security suspect, he asked his membership to be suspended and wrote: “I would like my membership to be suspended and stripped of my organizational responsibilities and due to my physical state, I cannot have any effective military activity within the framework of the NLA and take up responsibilities.” He continued living alongside the Mojahedin until he was eventually expelled in summer of 2001. He then asked in a letter to remain for two years at the exit section of the NLA and wrote: “I do not have any other request or expectation otherwise it would mean that I am playing the regime’s card.” But he later started threatening and blackmailing and when there was no doubt about him being the “regime’s card” he was expelled from the Mojahedin and went to Iran. He was later sent abroad together with Sobhani and a number of others by the Intelligence Ministry. It is interesting that Parhizkari claimed in an interview outside Iran that he has become paralyzed under torture by the Mojahedin.

Farhad Javaheri Yar
In a report by the Directorate of the NLA’s Counter Intelligence Ministry about Farhad Javaheri Yar we read: “He did body work for cars and came to Iraq from Pakistan in 1989 and joined the Mojahedin. In 1994 he became a security suspect due to his pledge for cooperation with the regime and his suspicious exit from a prison in Zahedan. From then on he always complained why ‘the organization is suspicious of me and considers me as an infiltrator.’” On November 26, 1995 he stole a wire clipper and attempted to run away from the Ashraf Camp. It was later discovered that he had stolen a car from an Iraqi national by misusing the NLA’s ID card and the military uniform and wanted to go to the Iraqi town of Tikrit but he was caught by the Police. He then requested to be pardoned in which a copy of it is enclosed.*** In his requested he admitted to have “intentions like a revolutionary guards” and “the crime he had committed and pledged that he will never ‘pervert’ in future. One year later after gaining confidence that there will be no punishments, he wrote: “Due to personal difficulties I am not able to continue the path, therefore I request to leave the organization and start an ordinary life. Please make the necessary arrangements.” At the same time when he ran away and on the same evening (Sunday evening, October 27, 1995), a car bomb near the central office of the People’s Mojahedin in Baghdad exploded and inflicted extensive damages to the surrounding buildings.9

- In his letter to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Mr. Massoudi wrote: “Five days after my eight hour interview and discussion with Sobhani he contacted me and said that he wanted to give me two other statements by Mojahedin defectors to be edited and typed and returned to him for release. Although this was a strange request I accepted and told him to fax the texts. Two days later, on Monday, August 5, he faxed to me a 10 page typed statement jointly signed by Javaheri Yar and Edvard Termadoyan. On the statement (a copy is enclosed) *** some corrections were made by hand and it was clear that the original text had neither come from Sobhani nor from Javaheri Yar and Termadoyan, but it was received in typing from outside Germany. It was clear that it came directly from the Intelligence Ministry in Tehran. The scenario by these two in this statement was similar to the scenario given by Sobhani and declared that “they were against the Mojahedin” and after their arrest by the organization they were handed over to the Iraqi authorities and then to the Iranian regime. In ambiguous circumstances they escaped from the Intelligence Ministry and came to Europe.
- The same scenario was repeated by another person named Hamidreza Barhoun a few days later. Whoever is familiar with the horrific prisons in Iran would know clearly that how improbable are the chances of running away for the political prisoners, especially for this many number of them. (this is repeated a few paragraphs ago) The number of political prisoners who have managed to run away in the past 20 years do not exceed a hand full. (This is a repeat) How come in such a short period of time a series of prisoners are running away and reach Europe rapidly safe and sound. Why thousands of Iranian refugees who are stranded in neighboring countries like Turkey, Pakistan, Azarbaijan, UAE and … have been waiting for years to seek refuge in Europe?
- The joint statement by Javaheri Yar and Termadoyan was as clumsy as their story for their escape was. Javaheri Yar claimed: “I was beaten six hours daily on average for the first two years and in September 1995 I was mock executed by hanging on marching ground of Axis 4 forces… Around the prison was wired with electric cable and the field was mined and guard dogs were used. I was in this solitary for three years and interrogations went on seven days a week from 6 am to 10 pm.” It is not clear why the Mojahedin should hand over such a person who had been “tortured” so much and mock executed, to the enemy (the Iranian regime) in good health to be used against themselves?
- It is interesting that when the Counter Terrorism Committee of the NCRI unveiled in advance the readiness of Javaheri Yar and Termadoyan on August 5, 1995 to be launched, the mullahs intelligence which was originally planning to release a joint statement, was obliged to retreat and released the statement with one week delay under the name of Termadoyan only on a site related to the Intelligence Ministry (called Mahdis) on August 13. Javaheri yar had no choice but remain in the queue for the time being.”

Edvard Termadoyan
The Counter Intelligence Committee of the NCRI released a statement on August 5, 2002 on Termadoyan stating: “Termadoyan was a soldier captured in Iran-Iraq war and in 1989, according to his own request, he joined the NLA. His registration no. with the ICRC is 0685 and had been interviewed privately several times by the ICRC. He was expelled from the NLA for acts of immorality whose details in his own handwriting and signature is available. He eventually returned to Iran in February 2002. There is a seven-page document in the enclosure10 ***which clearly shows that he originally intended to return personally to Iran with the help of the NLA, but he changed his mind and preferred to go through Iraqi government relevant bodies. Before leaving the Mojahedin base he thanked every single official for their efforts to provide him and his companions with their “welfare” at the exit center of the NLA and stipulated that, “you provided us with everything.”

By referring to the names of 16 former POWs who returned to Iran and were included in the Intelligence Ministry’s list, the Counter Intelligence Directorate of the NLA reported on June 22 under the heading of “Scandalous fabrication of lists by mullahs’ intelligence,” saying that “The return of former POWs have nothing to do with the Mojahedin.”11

But after his arrival in Tehran and receiving necessary briefs, Termadoyan was sent to Switzerland by the regime. In Switzerland, a group of asylum seekers protested against their presence among Iranians and the refugees. Three Iranian refugees wrote a joint letter on this matter saying: “A number of Intelligence Ministry’s henchmen have recently entered European countries under the guise of defectors of the Mojahedin Organization. These ridiculous shows are in fact part of preparations for terrorist and sabotage acts against the Iranian Resistance. In Switzerland too, the regime has brought in Termadoyan and has applied for asylum. We, as political refugees and supporters of the Resistance have protested to the refugee commission in Bern and expressed outrage against the presence of the regime’s henchman and we hope that all refugees will protest against these refugees in their countries of residence…”12

Hassan Sadeqian
In March 2000 he entered Iraq through Turkey. He presented himself to be a prisoner who was released, but later on it became evident that he was released upon a pledge to cooperate with the regime against the Mojahedin. He entered the admission center of the NLA but before completion of his admission period he declared that he could no longer go on and asked for help to return to Iran. But despite the agreement with his requests, he ran away from the NLA base in a suspicious way on March 9, 2001 and the Mojahedin did not have any information about him since then. According to the Intelligence Ministry’s list, it was later revealed that he too went to Iran together with Mohammad Hossein Sobhani.
A prisoner by the name of Mahmoud M. wrote a letter to Mojahed publication on August 30, 2002 which gave some information about him: “Hassan Sadeqian is son of Ebrahim living in 13 Aban street presenting himself as a ‘former member of the Mojahedin Organization.’ He was one of the prisoners who repented in hall no.2 of Evin prison training center headed by Haj Mehdi, one of the perpetrators of massacre of the political prisoners in Evin and he trusted Sadeqian. After his arrest, he repented as a result of interrogations and and the way he was dealt with by Haj Saeed and Lajevardi. Since then he had been betraying people in prison and writing reports about other prisoners. When it was not possible to go out of prison without a blind, he and other mercenaries could easily go out to see all prison guards and agents of the prosecutor’s office and the Intelligence Ministry and visit interrogation branches and take part in taking files and prisoners from solitary to the interrogation branches and receive bonuses.” (REF)

Committing murder and taking refuge with mullahs’
Adham Tayebi with a given name of Massoud, was one of the latest agents of the Intelligence Ministry who was dispatched abroad as one of the former leaders of the Mojahedin. He obtained his political asylum in Italy in 1994 (how can latest be 1994) as Farhang Golestaneh using a letter by the NCRI in support of his application. He was recruited by the Intelligence Ministry a few years ago. He went to Iraq in 1997 with his own insistence to join the resistance. In December 2001, with a prior plan, he stole a vehicle and a rifle from the Mojahedin in the outskirts of Baghdad. He fired at a member of the Mojahedin with the intention of killing him and then went to Iran through Iraqi Kurdistan with the help of the Intelligence Ministry in that area and through Iranian cities of Baneh and Saqez he arrived in Tehran.

The Intelligence Ministry dispatched him to Europe after he received the latest trainings to spy on Iranian refugees and activists of the Iranian Resistance and to prepare ground for terrorist operations against them. The Directorate of Counter Intelligence of the NLA referred to this case under the title of “a suspicious case” and wrote: “in December last year, an individual was disappeared around Baghdad. In view of the details (like forcing the passenger out of the car violently, stealing a rifle and the vehicle), it is quite obvious that there was a collaboration and prior contacts with the Intelligence Ministry to go to Iran. Specially since later the map and his route through the Chowarta and Chouman regions in Iraqi Kurdistan towards Baneh on Iranian soil was found and underneath the map, the distances and “scenario for smuggle,” the ‘pass,’ exchange rate for ‘Swiss dinar’ (used in Iraqi Kurdistan) to ‘Iraqi dinar’ were also registered. Although all indications point out that he was a mercenary and an infiltrator and had gone to the regime, his name is not included in the list of mercenaries until the investigations reach a decisive conclusion. Therefore release of names and information which are not possible at the moment and investigations about them are still going on, will be reported in the future.”14

Hamid Arbab, a member of the NLA who was together with him at time of his escape described the scene: “He was reducing the speed of car in a strange and suspicious way. I later found out that he wanted the convoy behind us to go passed us in order to be able to carry out his plan. He was very tense and nervous. After passing the ‘Souq al-Adl’ bridge he appeared in such a state that he did not seem to be able to drive and we decided that I should take over and drive. I left my rifle, documents, walkie talkie, jacket and wallet in the vehicle and got off from the vehicle to go towards the drivers door. As I was crossing over, the vehicle took off and the front bumper hit me and I was thrown a few meters away to the middle of the road and I became unconscious. I managed to pull myself together after a few minutes and realized that he wanted to run away and wanted to kill me too.”15

Tayebi who is now introducing himself as “the head of production, and program presenter of the Resistance’s satellite emission” simply played the role of an actor in TV comedy programs during the years he was in the border region in the Mojahedin base.

In a statement which appeared on the Internet site of the Intelligence Ministry based in Europe called Mahdis on July 31, Tayebi first smeared the Mojahedin and then claimed that he had recently obtained a refugee travel document from a European country.

Karim Haqi Moni: In an interview with France’s FR3 TV he introduced himself as “former head of personal protection of Maryam Rajavi and is now a political refugee in the Netherlands” and claimed that “he was a member of the People’s Mojahedin for 15 years” and as “the group diverted to sectarianism,” he decided to leave the organization.

This is while he had never been “the head of personal protection of Mrs. Rajavi” ever and the falsity of this claim and that “he has been a member of the Mojahedin for 15 years” can be proven in any impartial trial or investigation with ample undeniable documents and evidence. On the contrary to what he has claimed, he has never had a responsible role in the resistance movement. He was like  thousands of other combatants a member of a protection guard rota for a short period of time for one of the bases of the Mojahedin in Iraq. During the bombings of Iraq in 1990, he said that for physical reasons he could no longer remain in the NLA and asked to be transferred to Baghdad to lead an ordinary life which was agreed.

In a letter his wife, Mohtaram Babai, wrote: “As you know, after the bombing of Ashraf camp, the organization transferred me (she was a combatant of the NLA), my husband and my children, upon our request, to an urban base called Jalalzadeh in central Baghdad for more protection and care. During this period, in addition to everything that the combatants received, we enjoyed special care and facilities twice as much as what was given to any other combatant. On top of all these, we were given a private apartment, a family car and received 1000 Iraqi dinars per month.”

In this letter, Mohtaram Babai asked to be transferred to the United States together with her family. On the same day, that is October 28, 1992, Karim Haqi wrote a letter stating: “Before the arrangements for my family and I to go to the United States are made, Will you please take us back to Ashraf Camp for work and accommodate us in the camp, even if it meant for a six months period, in order to remove the label of defectors in face of the anti human enemy’s intentions and its surrogates abroad and traitor defector mercenaries.”16

In January 1993, Haqi and his wife and children were sent to France with their expenses for the trip and stay in France paid in full by the Mojahedin Organization. Within a few months more than 67,000 French Francs were paid to him by the Mojahedin. But after a few months he decided to go to the Netherlands and apply for asylum in that country. Therefore, since May 1993 he had no contacts with the Mojahedin.

In 1994 he was bought by the Intelligence Ministry of the regime and from 1995 he was in regular contact with a person by the name of Maqsoudi at the regime’s consulate in the Netherlands. It was then that after three years leaving Iraq he suddenly ‘remembered’ that he was imprisoned and tortured by the Mojahedin during the years he was in Iraq. The Iranians residing in the Netherlands know him very well as a hated figure, especially for his corrupt and immoral relations which led to his wife’s suicide. He tried in vain, with the help of the Intelligence Ministry to make political and propaganda gains against the Resistance with his wife’s death. The state-run dailies like Kayhan and Resalat quoted Karim Haqi in December 1995 saying that his wife was tortured in the Mojahedin’s prisons and went to the Netherlands after her release from the Mojahedin’s jails and in spite of months of treatment, she eventually died. Of course, the mullahs’ SAVAK (secret police) do not explain how after three years of living with Karim Haqi in Europe, Mohtaram Babai suddenly died, as a result of ‘tortures’ by the Mojahedin, without her saying anything about it?

But what are the facts? Mohtaram Babai’s last letter which contained most of the information about the reasons of her suicide is in the possession of the Dutch police. Jamshid Tafrishi who cooperated with the Intelligence Ministry and was a family friend of Karim Haqi said: “A few days after the Iranian New Years day in 1995 I contacted Karim Haqi at home to congratulate him for the new year. Mohtaram Babai, Karim Haqi’s wife answered the phone and said he was not at home. When I asked how she was, she was choking and talked with a broken voice and said: “I came from border region in Iraq because of Karim, I personally did not want to leave the organization but in any way I was ready to come to the Netherlands for him and Maral (their daughter). But since we have arrived in the Netherlands he has turned life for me into hell. And now he has made his relations with ***… public. Believe me sometimes I decide to commit suicide to rid myself from all these shame and disgrace, and have so far gone to the brink of killing myself several times.” It was a few days after this telephone call that Mohtaram hung herself from the ceiling in the bathroom of her residence.”17 
The responsibility of espionage network “Payvand” which has been launched by the Intelligence Ministry against the Iranian Resistance in the Netherlands is with Haqi. Karim Haqi receives money and other facilities directly from the Intelligence Ministry and is in contact with the rest of known agents of the Intelligence Ministry in Europe and the Intelligence Ministry publishes the “Peyvand” publication against the Iranian Resistance by Karim Haqi and a number of other mercenaries like Mehdi Khoshhal and Nadereh Afshari

In his revelations, Tafrishi said: “in April 1996, Karim Haqi met with Saeed Emami in Singapore and Peyvand publications was used as a cover to receive money for members of the network. After releasing the first issue of Peyvand in July 1997, Amir Hossein Taqavi (the European General Director of the Intelligence Ministry who was in charge of the general office of the special operations who directly guided the terrorist operations abroad) contacted me and asked for my views on the publication.”18

The extent of cooperations and contacts between Karim Haqi and the Intelligence Ministry of the regime against Iranian dissidents in Europe was so widespread that the Police authorities in that country approached him and warned him on the continuation of such activities and contacts.19

Towards the end of 1999 the Intelligence Ministry tried by discredited stage-managing to claim that the Mojahedin had raided Haqi’s house and office in Germany and the Netherlands and ransacked them. The last time was on March 28, 1998. He made a judicial complaint against the Mojahedin in the Netherlands in Arnheim, the city he resided. But the prosecutor of the city officially announced that "he did not consider the complaint to merit punitive investigation process in the Netherlands," therefore he would refrain from pursuing the complaint. (REF)

Karim Haqi was one of the organizers of the Intelligence Ministry's seminar on April 18, 2003 against the Mojahedin in Paris. During Mrs. Rajavi's detention in Paris, he was involved in a coordinated campaign trying to fill the empty judicial file with false propaganda against the Mojahedin. He told the French daily La Croix: "Having Mrs. Rajavi in jail gives us hope to live in Europe!" (REF-DATE)

Mehdi Khoshhal
During heavy bombardments of Iraq in 1990, he announced that he was no longer able to continue with the struggle and he was transferred to Turkey and eventually to Europe in 1991. The Intelligence Ministry published two books against the Mojahedin under his name one was "Spider Trap" and the other "Mojahedin schizophrenics."
As he had a close relationship with Karim Haqi, following the exposition of his contacts with the Intelligence Ministry, Khoshhal tried to cover his connections with him by working as the editor of Peyvand. In February 2000 the German security police took him for interrogation and warned him that they were aware of his connections with the Intelligence Ministry and the salary he receives from them.

Reza Assadi
Reza Assadi was working on the sidelines with the NLA in Iraq but after the war in Kuwait and the harsh situation which pursued, he went to the Iranian refugee camp in Ramadi in Iraq from Autumn 1991 and was under the care of the United Nations since. He was transferred to Europe in May 1992 using the means available for the Mojahedin with all the expenses paid by the Resistance. He is said to have claimed that the Mojahedin had separated his daughters from him by force. When Reza Assadi was leaving the Mojahedin’s base, the Mojahedin Organization offered his two daughters, Zohreh and Mahnaz, members of the Mojahedin to go along with their father if they wished. While rejecting the offer, they strongly requested to remain within the ranks of the Iranian Resistance and continue with their struggle until the overthrow of mullahs' inhuman regime. It is interesting that Ms. Zohreh Assadi, one of his daughters who is claimed to be taken as a hostage by the Mojahedin, was working in the offices of the Iranian Resistance in Europe for about five years in 1990s.
Reza Assadi was one of the people who was taken for interrogation by the Dutch security police for his connections with the Intelligence Ministry in February 2000.

Deplorable treatment of children and German courts judgment

Hadi Shams Haeri, born in 1943, went to Iraq at the time when the NLA was formed and was working on the sidelines at the logistics for a while. When the Kuwaiti crisis began and as the situation in the region was getting harsh, he could no longer continue with the hardship of the struggle and on April 4, 1991 asked to leave the NLA. He wrote: “I basically never considered myself as a member of the Mojahedin in the past 15 years specially since 1978… and now I consider myself as a political person outside the organization and its internal relations.” 20 In a letter on June 22, 1991 he wrote: “I request the organization to send me to Ramadi camp.”

On July 1, 1991, he again asked in writing to be transferred to the above mentioned camp. He was subsequently transferred to the refugee camp under the supervision of the United Nations. While in this camp, Haeri regularly received funds from the Mojahedin and the receipts are available for inspection. Even so, he referred to Ramadi camp, in his writings later in Europe, as the Mojahedin’s prison or exile. 

When leaving the NLA base he asked his wife, Ms. Mahin Nazari, to go along with him, as well. But Ms. Mahin Nazari who has been a member of the Mojahedin since the 1980s refused to go despite a proposal by the Mojahedin to accompany her husband, and she said that she would never do that under any circumstances.

Before this date, in 1990, after the start of the Persian Gulf crisis (You keep on calling it the Kuwaiti crisis and the Persian Gulf Crisis. Make up your mind) their two children were sent to Germany upon their written request. The children started their education in Germany. After his transfer to the refugee camp he claimed that the Mojahedin had separated him from his children and he requested in writing for his children to be returned to him in Ramadi in Iraq. Despite all the legal and practical difficulties, the Mojahedin took back his two children from Germany to Iraq and were handed over to him in Ramadi.

After their transfer to Ramadi which cost a lot of money and energy, he started exploiting the children and forced them to sell cigarettes and go begging in the  streets. His treatment of the two children led to a point that they hated him forever. A few weeks later, he abandoned his two children with a note on the streets of Baghdad near the Mojahedin’s office.21

Towards the end of 1992 he went to the Netherlands through the United Nations and sought refuge there. And in the meantime he started his activities against the Resistance in close contact with the agents of the Intelligence Ministry. He produced a book on behalf of the Intelligence Ministry entitled, “Failed reactionary in competition with reactionary in power” repeating the same allegations made by the regime against the Mojahedin. This book was published as a series of articles for four months in 16 issues of the state-run weekly Kayhan Havaii.22

On Shams Haeri’s changes towards supporting the regime, Kayhan weekly wrote: “Obviously, when Haeri was writing his book he was still under the influence of the thoughts and ideas of the organization in its totality… after a while, particularly if he tried to continue with his studies on the governing body and the society in present Iran away from any common hostility, he would achieve new views, different from previous ones on the Velayate Faqih’s system in Iran…”23(I don’t understand this)

Kayhan weekly also wrote that another book written by him against the Resistance entitled “Impass of perversion” had been published and distributed by Kayhan publications. This book was publicized in Kayhan for a long time.24

It is reminded that the Kayhan daily represents the most extremist section of the faction supporting the vali-e faqih, Khamenei, and its editor in chief is Hossein Shariatmadari, a GC Brigadier General and is one of the main interrogators and torturers of political prisoners in the past two decades.

After that, in line with the Intelligence Ministry he once again started his efforts to misuse his children against the Resistance. Therefore he submitted a complaint to the court in Cologne (where his children resided) requesting the hand over of his children. Amir and Nosrat, his two children who were previously mistreated and exploited and abandoned on the streets, were no longer willing to go with him, therefore the court in Cologne voted decisively against him on June 7, 1994.
The decision by the court in part reads: “After listening to the parents’ statement, the children and the Youth Office, the court is convinced that the welfare of the children is guaranteed with their mother more than anywhere else. Both children in the beginning clearly stated that they want to be with their mother in future… Father’s request for appointing a guardian for them under current circumstances cannot be accepted. Guardianship by parents take priority… the danger of one sided political influence over the children appears greater with father than the mother…”25

According to a well calculated and complex plan by the Intelligence Ministry known as “turning the human rights' card against the Resistance,” Shams Haeri approached international human rights bodies together with several other mercenaries like Karim Haqi to ‘prove’ that the main violator of human rights in Iran was not the mullahs’ ruling regime in Iran, but was the Mojahedin. 
These people met with Prof. Maurice Copithorne, Special Representative of the UN Human Rights Commission in February 1996, representative of the Human Rights Watch in Cologne in February 1997 and representative of Amnesty International in Frankfurt in …*** 1997.
The reason for this was the fact that the regime had until then been condemned 49 times by highest organs of the United Nations having executed more than 120,000 political prisoners and jailed and tortured hundreds of thousands. The first chapter of this book explains about this.

Hassan Hatami who was a friend of Shams Haeri and had joint activities against the Resistance and was present in meetings with international bodies, unveiled the plot by the regime later in a letter addressed to Prof. Copithorne on April 17, 1999. In his letter he wrote: “The fact was that the meeting between this group and yourself took place on the bases of a well calculated plan by the Intelligence Ministry. Its main organizers were the agents of the Intelligence Ministry including Naser Khajeh-Nouri (from US), Freidoun Gilani (from Germany), Karim Haqi Moni and Ahmad Shams Haeri (from the Netherlands) and …*** around two weeks after meeting with you, someone by the name of Maqsoudi called me from the regime’s embassy in the Netherlands and applauded me for my meeting with you… I should tell you that the Intelligence Ministry was contacting all those who were in contact with the Mojahedin at one stage in the past to recruit them against the Mojahedin.”26

Amir Nazari-Shams, son of Hadi Shams Haeri, joined the NLA when he reached 18. Shams Haeri started sending letters to international bodies against the Mojahedin. Amir Nazari wrote a letter to the Special Reporter of the UN on human rights in Iran explaining briefly about the state of his father.27

- In January and February 2000 police in European countries approached 17 agents of the Intelligence Ministry who were working for the regime against political refugees in various countries under the guise of members of the opposition. They were warned against their cooperation with the Intelligence Ministry. Ahmad Haeri was one of those who received the warning.28
Some of the political prisoners who have been released in recent years have reported that books by Hadi Shams Haeri and some of the other mercenaries are used by the torturers as teaching texts in prisons and safe houses of the Intelligence Ministry. They force the victims to read these books outside the hours of interrogation and torture. They are later asked questions about the book and if the torturers feel that they have not taken the books seriously, then they would be tortured for this reason.

Tragic hand over of a 11-year-old child to mullahs henchmen and verdicts by courts in the Netherlands and Canada against mullahs’ agents

Habib Khorami came to Iraq through Turkey together with his wife, Leila Qanbari, in 1988. While in Turkey they had a baby boy named Bahador. They were not even in Iraq for two years that the Kuwaiti crisis erupted and the situation became difficult. In the beginning he and his wife asked the organization to send their two-year-old son out of Iraq to be in a safe place.29
At a later stage in the same year, 1990, he said that he could no longer work and asked to be sent to the United Nations refugee camp in Iraq. The Mojahedin Organization asked his wife to go with him to the refugee camp. But she ran away from the refugee camp and went to the UN authorities in Baghdad and returned to the Mojahedin.30
After a little while he asked the organization to send him to Turkey but he changed his mind later and requested to be transferred to Europe. When the organization agreed with his request, he thanked the organization in a letter.31 He was eventually sent to the Netherlands.
His son (Bahador) was sent to Canada and he was recognized as a refugee.32 An honorable Iranian family (Pira) took care of him and took up his guardianship. They were a young couple who did not have a child of their own and adopted Bahador as their own child. The authorities in Canada also recognized their guardianship.33
Bahador remained with Pira family and Leila Qanbari, Bahador’s real mother, asked them to treat Bahador like their real son so that he would not feel in a vacuum in terms of parental compassion. In the meantime she remained in regular contact with the family.
Habib did not have any contact with the Pira family until 1998. During this time he was recruited by the Intelligence Ministry. On the basis of a plan by the Intelligence Ministry he went to Canada in early 1999 in order to separate Bahador from his adopted family. He intended to misuse this child for the mullahs’ dirty political animosity and to exert pressure on the child’s mother. Bahador who seemed to have sensed the evil intention of Habib, did not want to see him. Mrs. Shafii, Bahador’s guardian tried to convince him, who was then 11-year-old, that Habib was his father. Habib’s request was to take Bahador to the Netherlands for a month during the Christmas and New Year’s holidays. Bahador did not want to go but upon Mrs. Shafii’s insistence he agreed. Mrs. Shafii bought him a return ticket and asked for only one month’s leave for him.34
When at the end of the month Habib did not send back Bahador to Canada, the Shafii family  who considered Bahador as their child went to the Canadian court and on January 12, 1999 the court voted that Bahador should be returned to his guardian family.35
As Habib intended to carry out the plot by the Intelligent Ministry, he ignored the court order. In the meantime Bahador insisted that he wanted to return to his guardian family and Habib in turn tried to clear the memory of this family from his mind by insulting them. When this failed he started beating and torturing the boy and forbid him from ever mentioning this family. Bahador explained the situation to his social worker at school and said that he wanted to speak to Mrs. Shafii in Canada. The Social worker put him in contact with the Canadian embassy in the Netherlands and it was through the embassy that he managed to speak to his guardian and explain everything that had happened to him (the tape of this conversation is available at the Canadian embassy in the Netherlands).
To rescue the boy, Mrs. Shafii went to the Netherlands and submitted a complaint against Habib Khorami. Considering the background and the Canadian court ruling and the conversation the Dutch judge had with Bahador on September 28, 1999 the Dutch court decided that the child should return to his guardians and that Habib Khorami had in fact committed an act of child abduction.36
Following the court verdict, Habib hid Bahador and he also disappeared so that the ruling could not be put into action. Afterwards the court confirmed the decision by the preliminary court ruling and in addition, ordered Habib to pay 5000 Guilden for each day of delay in returning Bahador to his guardians.37
At this stage he should have submitted to the court ruling and the law and returned the child to his legal guardians, but instead, with the intervention of the mullahs’ regime’s embassy in the Netherlands and with the help of the Intelligence Ministry’s gang of mercenaries (Karim Haqi, Mohammad-Reza Eskandari, and Tahereh Khorami), the innocent child was transferred to Iran under the mullahs’ rule 38. This was the end of a part of a conspiracy worked out since several months ago by the Intelligence Ministry.
From here on Mrs. Shafii, who had spent a lot of money to save the life of Bahador and to guarantee a future for him could not do anything else, therefore, together with Ms. Qanbari, they resorted to international human rights bodies and wrote separate letters to Prof. Copithorne to seek his intervention in this tragic story.39
In the meantime the Dutch police detained Habib. When it became evident that he should go to jail for not acting upon the court’s ruling, he threatened Mrs. Shafii’s lawyer in the Netherlands to death and said that “he would kill him and his family when he gets out of jail.” It is not clear what else he had told the lawyer but this threat to a Dutch lawyer caused him to drop the case and he was not even prepared to unveil it officially or publicly and only said that if he does then Habib might get even more angry with him.40
Habib Khorami tried to convince the Canadian court that the guardianship of Pira family was not approved by him right from the beginning, and therefore not valid. Subsequently the court made a thorough investigation and issued a verdict which rejected all his claims decisively and in addition ruled that the Iranian government should make arrangements to help the child to return to his guardians.41 This is of course something which has not been done yet and in light of the mullahs’ disrespect of all international rules and norms, the possibility of this being materialized is very low.
After all this process, based on previous verdicts issued by courts in the Netherlands and Canada, in Autumn 2002, the Dutch appeals court once again found Habib Khorami guilty of child abduction and sentenced him to 18 months of imprisonment, payment of 300,000 Euro as cash fine, six months of suspended prison term and payment of all court expenses.
Mohammad-Reza Eskandari and his wife, Tahereh Khorami collaborated with Habib throughout all this process. These two are members of an Intelligence Ministry gang in the Netherlands who take part in various activities against the Mojahedin. They are also among those who were interrogated by the Dutch police for their connections with the Intelligence Ministry.

These two were also involved in a stage-managed scenario by the Intelligence Ministry in the Netherlands to pretend as if the Mojahedin had attacked Karim Haqi’s house and caused damages to the premises and stolen some equipment.
In a statement on April 14, 2002, the Counter-terrorism Commission of the NCRI wrote: “In a letter to ‘the Special Reporter on the Rights of Self determination of National Minorities,’ they wrote that the Mojahedin by ‘relying on full support’ given by Iraq, resorts to terrorist and violent operations and murder of innocent civilians and bombing and launching mortars in Iranian cities… By adopting violent and terrorist methods, this organization is acting as a serious obstacle on the path to a peaceful transformation to an open and democratic society in the present situation in Iran.” This letter was signed by agents like, Mohammad-Reza Eskandari, Ali-Akbar Rastgou, Hassan Khalaj, Hadi Shams Haeri, Habib Khorami, Tahereh Khorami, Karim Haqi, Mehdi Khoshhal and Jaafar Baqal.
During a trip by above mentioned agents to Tehran, the mullahs’ intelligence decided to strengthen newspapers like Peyvand and Dena, therefore more writers were allocated to Kayhan publications under the supervision of GC brigadier general Hossein Shariatmadari to serve this purpose. Some of their earlier issues were prepared in such hast that their authors did not have enough time to make literary changes in the texts.

Murderers and criminals
Qasem Salehi Fargani: One of the people used by the Intelligence Ministry in Iran to meet with the journalists and foreign visitors, acting as a former member of the People’s Mojahedin was Qasem Salehi. He was a veteran agent of the Intelligence Ministry who was sent into the ranks of the Resistance with a specific mission to assassinate (who?). He entered the Iraqi soil through the Qasr-e Shirin border region with the help of the Intelligence Ministry in January 1998. On June 13, 1999, he shot and killed from behind Mahmoud Agah, a member of the Mojahedin in an Abadan bus terminal. He wounded two other members of the Mojahedin and several innocent passengers and then went to the Intelligence Department. In subsequent investigations it was revealed that in 1992 he had committed a murder and in order to evade an execution sentence he was recruited by the Intelligence Ministry and was used as a professional killer.

Ali Qashqavi: Born in 1969 in Babol, north Iran. He went to Iraq through Turkey in 1993 and joined the NLA. He was later found to be a security suspect and a member of Hezbollah since 1986 who had then gone to the army serving in group 22 of Artillery in Esfahan. In his admission he wrote that he was briefed by Haji Rezapour and Qorbanali Sadeqi at Babol Intelligence Department in mid 1993. After being pardoned in May 1998, he left the Mojahedin and according to the Intelligence Ministry’s list, he returned to Iran in February 2002.

Abbas Sadeqi Nejad: On April 25, 1991 he was assigned by the intelligence commander of the Revolutionary Guards and representative of supreme leader in Malayer and other government authorities to infiltrate into the NLA. As a lieutenant in the army he requested to join the NLA several months after failed attacks by the Guards Corps against the NLA forces along Iran-Iraq border region. His mission was to carry out a suicide attack against the leadership of the Mojahedin which failed and he was arrested by the NLA’s counter Intelligence. He was detained for three months and then expelled from the NLA to go after normal life, but he insisted on remaining with the Mojahedin. In a letter in which he admitted to his mission he wrote: “I was assigned by Ali-Mohammad Panji from the Revolutionary Guards Corps on April 25, 1991. In the meeting where I was assigned, Gholam Akbari, head of the intelligence, Manouchehr Abedi, supreme leader’s representative in Malayer, Ali Fazelian, Friday prayers leader at the time, Mansour Omid, Revolutionary Guards Corps deputy and Reza Esmail-Pour, in charge of the Guards Corps supply in extraterritorial operations were present. My assignment was to carry out a suicide attack against the leadership of the People’s Mojahedin Organization using hand grenade or TNT which had to be prepared locally… to avoid any leakage of information on the mission I was supposed to go for it on my own and plan for necessary supplies and the operation on the scene. The location for operation had to be in a general meeting.”
On April 17, 2001, Sadeqi Nejad received a coded letter together with a message from his wife from Iran. The purpose of the letter was to call him back to the headquarters to see why the mission was not carried out. Upon the receipt of the message he planned his escape to Iran and in June 2002 he stole a vehicle, some money and equipment and ran (with a car?) to Iran through the Jalawla region, 30 km from the Iranian border.

Broken under pressure
Maassoumeh (Marjan) Malek Seyed Abadi and Houra Shalchi: Two women who were often used by the Intelligence Ministry inside Iran as former members of the Mojahedin were Maassoumeh (Marjan) Malek Seyed Abadi and Houra Shalchi. These two who were never members of the Mojahedin were arrested in November 2000 near Orumieh, north-west of Iran. Under severe tortures they were forced to cooperate with the regime to whitewash its image. It was in a press conference by the Intelligence Ministry on April 20, 2001 that for the first time they spoke against the resistance. There were seven other men in this conference, which was taking place only two days after the launching of 77 missiles against the bases of the People’s Mojahedin on the Iran-Iraq border region.

Making false martyrs
Rabe’e Shahrokhi who falsely claimed that she was the mother of 4 members of the Mojahedin who had been executed, claimed that her child by the name of Davood Ahmadi had been executed by the Mojahedin. She was sent to Sweden by the Mojahedin in 1991 together with her daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law (wife of Davood Ahmadi) and her two grand sons. Davood Ahmadi, committed suicide in Iraq in February 2000. His wife later explained the reasons for which he committed suicide (in connection with immoral acts and personal reasons) in a letter. The certificate of the Coroners office on his death and a video tape of his funeral in Iraq is available where Rabe’e was also present. The Intelligence Ministry claimed in a statement issued in September 2002 which was signed by a number of its agents mentioned above that the Mojahedin raided Shahrokhi’s house in Gothenburg in Sweden on September 3, 2002. Mr. Ali-Akbar Aramideh, son-in-law of Mrs. Shahrokhi who has been in contact with this family for 27 years according to his own writing, referred to Mrs. Sharokhi’s claims in a letter which was published in Mojahed publication no. 600 dated September 17, 2002 and wrote: “One must tell the Intelligence Ministry of the mullahs that breaking the door and damaging house hold like freezer between 10 am and 2 pm, at a time when all residents of apartments are awake would not be possible unless it was done in collaboration with the occupants of the apartment.”

Rabe’e Shahrokhi was one of participants of the Intelligence Ministry’s seminar on October 25, 1996. Khajeh-Nouri, organizer of this seminar, took her to Los Angeles with all her expenses paid for by the Intelligence Ministry. While there she was given enough time to make many baseless accusations against the Mojahedin. She was later taken by Khajeh-Nouri to New York to smear against the Mojahedin among human rights organizations. Rabe’e Shahrokhi was also invited to the Intelligence Ministry seminar in Paris held in January 1996. In recent years, she has been making the dirtiest accusations against the Mojahedin in the Intelligence Ministry’s external organ, Payvand. The materials prepared by the Intelligence Ministry are printed under her name.

She presents herself as the mother of four martyrs in an attempt to misuse the honor of the Mojahedin martyrs to whitewash the crimes of the regime and undermine the Mojahedin. The truth is that she only had one of her sons martyred whose name was Gholamreza Ahmadi, a member of the Mojahedin, executed in Evin Prison in 1982 by Lajevardi, the notorious head of prison. Rabe’e had three other sons and three daughters. Her elder son, Gholam-Abbas Ahmadi was a member of the shah’s guards’ music band who died in an accident in 1977 at the guards base. Her third son by the name of Davood, committed suicide in 1989 and I was at the time in touch with every detail on it closely. Her forth son sought refuge in one of the Scandinavian countries with an adopted identity and her mother falsely claims that he has disappeared and sometimes presents him as a martyr. Her daughters are all alive.

In regards to her claim about being beaten by two Arabs who were recruited by the Mojahedin, it needs to be reminded that this is an absolute lie and fabricated by the Intelligence Ministry. It is common knowledge among Iranians residing in Gothenburg know that after Shahrokhi was beaten up, she was interviewed by two Swedish TV channels, no. 2 and 4 on their news programs and she said that two youngsters aged between 15 and 16 of Swedish origin attacked her and she thought they were racists. But later, in cooperation with the Intelligence Ministry, she claimed that the two youngsters were Swedish of Arab origins and were recruited by the Mojahedin.41

Two ridiculous cases
Ali Akbar (Bahman) Rastgou: He is also known as Dr. Bahmanyar and has been in contact with the agents of the regime’s embassy in Germany since, at least early 1995. In 1985 he requested to join the forces of the Resistance in the Iran-Iraq border region but only stayed there for 4 months and then returned to Germany at the same time, 18 years ago.

One of his brothers by the name of Bijan Rastgou is known to be an agent working with the Intelligence Ministry in Babol, north of Iran. He was the main element to attract Ali Akbar to work with the Intelligence Ministry.

In May 1995 he obtained an Iranian passport from the Intelligence Ministry’s branch at the regime’s embassy in Bonn and subsequently went to Iran. Upon his arrival at Tehran airport he was taken through the special entrance gate without any checks and taken by the Intelligence Ministry’s car to the private house of a person by the name of Engineer Babaii from the Intelligence Ministry. He spent two weeks in Iran, one week of which was spent for training by the Ministry. On his return to Germany, the ministry gave him a lot of books and publications against the Iranian Resistance to be distributed among Iranians. (REF)

In a seminar in Los Angeles on October 25, 1996 which was organized by Khajeh-Nouri, he spoke as the former head of the international relations of the Mojahedin against the resistance. This is while he has never even been a member of the Mojahedin.

Nadereh Afshari: She was in one of the Mojahedin bases in the border region for 15 months from March 1988 to June 1990. She has never been a member of the Mojahedin and she was asked to leave the border region for her inappropriate and immoral relationship with others and was then sent abroad.
She worked with the Association of Mojahedin Supporters in Germany for a while and when the Mojahedin’s children were taken to Cologne during the bombardment of Iraq, she helped look after these children along with other Mojahedin supporters. Almost six years after she was expelled from the border region in early 1997, she was recruited by the Intelligence Ministry and started smearing the Mojahedin. Dozens of articles and interviews by her were published in regime’s official dailies like Kayhan Havaii, Kayhan and also unofficial dailies of the Intelligence Ministry abroad like Nimrouz.

In August 1997, the majority of the US Congress issued a statement condemning the human rights violations in Iran and emphasized on supporting the president-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Nadereh Afshari was assigned to send letters to members of the Congress on August 26, 1997 raising 17 false allegations against the Mojahedin. These included the killing of several hundred members of the Mojahedin during the Iran-Iraq war,  the massacre of Kurds and Shi’ites in Iraq and that the Mojahedin formed the security and military body for Saddam Hussein. In an interview with a Farsi language radio in Los Angeles called Radio Voice of Iran, (REF-Date) she claimed on September 21 that members of Congress were paid 30, 100 and 200 dollars to support the resistance. (Are you sure that you don’t mean 30,,000 dollars, they would have to be pretty cheap to work for 30 dollars) On February 9, 1996, Nadereh Afshari together with a number of other defectors met with Prof. Copithorne before he went to Iran, (Did Copithorne go to Iran?) to accuse the Mojahedin of violations of human rights. Details of the meeting which was arranged by Khajeh-Nouri, the Intelligence Ministry agent, were unveiled by Jamshid Tafreshi, former agent of the mullahs’ intelligence.
When the police in European countries warned 17 agents of the Intelligence Ministry who were working under the guise of opponents of the regime against the political refugees in various countries In February 2000, Nadereh Afshari was one of these agents. 43
At a later stage, Fereydoun Gilani revealed in a letter to Nimrouz weekly that during his hysteric attacks against the Mojahedin, he was in contact with the mullahs’ intelligence agents and received directions. 44 This was the time when he and Nadereh Afshari could agree on one thing, which was animosity against the Mojahedin.

Footnotes:
1. Lord Avebury, vice-chairman, British Parliamentary Human Rights Group
2. Rafsanjani
3. Ghorbanali Dori Najaf Abadi, IRNA, December 4, 1998
4. Mohammad Mohaddessin, letter to Kofi Annan, April 27, 2002
5. Statement by Counter-Terrorism Commission of the NCRI, April 30, 2002
6. Ibid.
7. Ramin Darami, letter to “Haj Saeed,” Mojahed publication no. 597, August 8, 2002
8. Mahmoud Massoudi, letter to Ruud Luberz, August 18, 2002
9. Statement by the People’s Mojahedin of Iran, Baghdad, November 27, 1995
10. Hand-written documents by Edvard Termadoyan and Farhad Javaheri Yar, the book “Burned cards”, Iran Ketab, August 2002, pages 259 to 265, annex
11. Report by the Counter Intelligence Directorate of the NLA on discovery of plots by infiltrators of the Intelligence Ministry, Mojahed publication no. 592, July 2, 2002
12. Letter to the refugee commission, Fereshteh Chazani, Farideh Chazani and Amir Taja
13. Mohammad Mohaddess, letter to the Middle East Programs Director, Amnesty International, 5 July 2002
14. Report by the Counter Intelligence Directorate of the NLA on discovery of plots by infiltrators of the Intelligence Ministry, Mojahed publication no. 592, July 2, 2002
15. Hamid Arbab, letter to Mojahed, Mojahed publication no. 598, August 16, 2002, rout map to run away
16. Mohtaram Babai, Karim Haqi, letters, Annex
17. Jamshid Tafrishi, “Intelligence Ministry’s plans and conspiracies” Iran Ketab, Winter 2001
18. Ibid.
19. Chapter five of this book, footnote no. 2
20. Hadi Shams Haeri, letter to the NLA, May 31, 1991
21. Hadi Shams Haeri, letter to the People’s Mojahedin Organization after leaving his children on streets…
22. Kayhan Havaii nos …*** to … from: … to …
23. Kayhan Havaii, October 20, 1993
24. Kayhan Havaii, book publicity “Deadlock of perversion” Shams Haeri, December 15, 1997
25. Court in Cologne, July 7, 1994 verdict
26. Hassan Hatami, letter to Prof. Copithorne, April 17, 1999
27. Amir Shams Haeri, letter to Copithorne
28. Chapter 13 of this book, footnote no. 2
29. Habib Khorami and Leila Qanbari, letter requesting to send Bahador Khorami abroad, annex
30. Leila Qanbari, letter requesting to return to the Mojahedin Organization, annex
31. Habib Khorami, letter thanking Mojahedin for sending him to Europe
32. Bahador Khorami, acceptance of his application for asylum in Canada
33. letter of acceptance of Bahador Khorami’s guardianship in Canada
34. Bahador Khorami, leave from school
35. Canadian court, decision to return Bahador Khorami to Pira family in Canada
36. Dutch court, verdict in favor of returning Bahador Khorami to his guardian family
37. Dutch court document fining Habib Khorami
38. See appendice
39. Mrs. Shafii and Leila Qanbari letters to Copithorne
40. See appendix…***
41. Canadian court, second ruling in favor of Bahador Khorami
42. Ali-Akbar Aramideh, letter to Mojahed publication no. 600, September 17, 2002
43. Chapter 13 of this book, footnote 2 ***
44. Nimrouz weekly, date: ?***