The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps' elite Qods (Jerusalem) Force is the most secret of the Iranian regime's numerous military organizations. Since its inception in 1990, the clerics have kept it under such secrecy that even many top officials in Tehran know nothing about the "Qods Force" except the name of its commander, Ahmad Vahidi. The new force, referred to as the "seed of the International Islamic Army" by its commanders, has now turned into the Guards Corps' most active, skilled, and elite unit. It includes the Corps' most experienced commanding officers and personnel. Its task is defined as "commanding, planning, and executing extra, territorial operations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps." Its commander directly reports to the regime's leader, Khamenei. The Qods Force directly supervises or at least coordinates all terrorist operations or activities related to the "export of the Islamic Revolution" to various countries. The Qods Force was established following a detailed appraisal by Iranian leaders of their extensive terrorist activities in the 1980s.
Prior to the formation of the Qods Force, the Guards Corps consisted of the army, the navy, the air force, and the Bassij (paramilitary urban security unit). Formed as an independent body, the Qods Force was placed under the command of the Guards Corps Central Headquarters. The Qods force commander, Vahidi, is a Guards Corps brigadier general and was formerly the commander of the Intelligence Directorate (a key department at the Guards Corps Central Headquarters). Once the Qods Force was formed, the Ramadhan and Ansar headquarters and the Lebanon Corps were placed under Vahidi's command. Despite numerous changes in the Guards Corps in recent years, Vahidi's position has remained unchanged.
Final coordination of the Qods Force's activities in a given country and provision of the appropriate diplomatic or other cover for its agents, the use of diplomatic facilities and immunities to get supplies and messages, and provision of arms and military equipment for terrorists fall within the responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassies. The regime's embassies also gather detailed information on the activities of opposition groups and personalities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs passes on the information to the Qods Force.
Organizational Structure
The most experienced Guards Corps commanders, particularly those active in extraterritorial operations, have been gathered in the General Staff of the Qods Force. In fact, there are no essential differences between members of the Qods Force Staff and the G.C. General Staff. The commanders of Intelligence, Operations, and Training directorates, for instance, are among the Qods Force's key commanders. Commander of the Qods Operations Directorate is G.C. Brigadier General Hussein Moslehi, the ex-commander of the Lebanon Corps. It was under his command that the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut was blown up in 1983. Upon returning from Lebanon, Moslehi assumed command of the 1st Sarollah Corps, the G.C.'s most experienced and largest force in the Iran, Iraq War. The 1st Corps was made up of the Muhammad Rasulullah, Seyyed osh-Shohada, and Ali ibn Abi Talib divisions, which spearheaded the Khomeini regime's offensives in the Iran-Iraq War. The commander of the Qods Force's Intelligence Directorate, Guards Corps Brigadier General Muhammad-Ja'far Sahraroudi, was previously the commander of Ramadhan Headquarters. He was the field commander involved in the assassination of Abdul-Rahman Qassemlou in Vienna in the summer of 1989. Carrying a fake passport with the name of Rahimi, Sahraroudi was arrested by the Austrian police. Following the regime's intervention, however, the Austrian government sent him to Tehran. The commander of the Training Directorate is Guards Corps Brigadier General Shams. He was the ex-commander of a G.C. base in northwest Iran, subordinate to Ramadhan Headquarters. Subsequently, he headed the 9th Badr Division, comprising Iraqi POWs and nationals who joined the Iranian regime's forces. Shams commanded the regime's forces sent into Iraq in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. After the unrest in southern Iraq subsided, Shams became the commander of operations in northern Iraq. His deputy, Orouj, commands the Imam Ali training garrison in Tehran. Before his appointment to this post, Orouj was the commander of the Guards Corps Special Security Corps and in charge of Khamenei's bodyguard unit. Another major section of the Qods Force is its Directorate of Finance , headed by Talebi. Because of the Qods Force's extraterritorial activities, the Directorate has been divided into two sections, one of which makes the financial arrangements for the forces sent abroad. Other key officers of the Qods Force include Manshavi, the head of the Commandant's Office, and Ahmad Salek, Khamenei's representative to the Force. Before the inception of the Qods Force, Manshavi commanded the extraterritorial forces of the G.C. General Staff. He also commanded the Sudanese nationals trained in Iran. Before being transferred to the Qods Force, mullah Salek was the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Komitehs, which later merged with the national police to form the State Security Forces. Salek is also the director of the Bureau of Islamic Movements in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a majlis deputy, and a member of the Assembly of Experts. He has played an instrumental role in the regime's terrorist actions abroad since 1979. He was also a key figure in the post-Persian Gulf War disturbances in Iraq. Salek attends a meeting with Khamenei every Tuesday. In addition to the military staff, the Qods Force has a politically oriented staff called the General Staff for the Export of Revolution that handles the export of fundamentalism and terrorism to different countries. Specific assignments are surveyed and parceled out to different directorates of the Qods Force, including the directorates for: 1. Iraq 2. Palestine, Lebanon, and Jordan 3. Turkey 4. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Indian subcontinent 5. Western countries (Europe, United States) 6. North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, and Morocco) 7. Arabian Peninsula 8. Republics of the former Soviet Union According to a Qods Force official, the General Staff for the Export of Revolution was formed with the objective of "removing a fundamental weakness" of the regime's past policy of exporting of revolution. As he put it: "Despite our prior extensive military activities in these countries, the absence of a clear political superstructure did not allow us to reap the maximum benefit from these activities. Now, we are striving to have our own political groups or alternatives in each of these countries, so that our work will bear results." Each directorate of the General Staff for the Export of Revolution is responsible for establishing political ties with individuals and forces within the country under its jurisdiction to lure them to Khomeini's ideology. For instance, there have been large-scale efforts to forge relations with factions of the Muslim Brotherhood or other religious forces in the Arab countries. Meanwhile, the General Staff for the Export of Revolution has also been active against the regime's opponents. A close confidant of Rafsanjani describes these activities: The issue of the Mojahedin concerns the Qods Force. The Qods Force has different directorates for different countries. For example, there are directorates for Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. If the Iranian nationals-the Mojahedin, the counter-revolutionaries, and so on-engage in some kind of activity against the Islamic Republic, these directorates handle their cases and make the appropriate decisions.
|
