Saeed Hajjarian PDF Print E-mail
ImageOn March 12, 2000, Saeed Hajjarian, a close advisor of Khatami and member of the Tehran municipal council, was the target of an attempted assassination. “Hajjarian is a former hard-liner who founded the notorious Intelligence Ministry ”, and like most of the  reformers in the Iranian government including the President’s brother, was one of the students who took over the United States embassy in Tehran in 1979 . He served as a deputy minister before leaving shortly before the new president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, brought in his own security team in 1989.

No one claimed responsibility for the attack. Within hours of the shooting, dozens of security checkpoints were erected across Tehran and police were checking motorcycles and cars. Intelligence Minister Ali Younessi said the assailants had been identified.

In a speech in the central province of Yazd, Khatami condemned the attackers as hated “terrorists” who have “no place among the people”.

Khamenei described the assassination as “part of a dangerous plot, which might endanger the interests of the country, the people and the Islamic system ”. The attempt on Saeed Hajjarian’s life may have signalled the start of a new phase in the struggle within the Iranian establishment. Up to that point it had been a war of words, but now for the first time, the blood of an insider had been shed. Ali Rabi’i, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Iran’s top security body, said, “Those who chose Hajjarian to be their assassination target knew they would create a crisis in the country by doing so”.

This was a view shared by many observers. As one wrote, “After 21 stressful years of living under clerical dictatorship, most Iranians would happily settle for a more normal life. But last week... an assassin’s bullet provided a shocking reminder of how grim and uncertain a struggle may yet lie ahead.

The crime also prompted some to admonish the US government not to get close to Tehran.  “Recent acts of political violence in Iran illuminate a fundamental uncertainty haunting that strategically crucial country. The attempted assassination of Saeed Hajjarian... suggests that the struggle for power between hard-line clerics and reformers may not be settled by peaceful, democratic means. In the early days of the Islamic republic, he [Hajjarian] served as deputy intelligence minister, instituting a secret service that has been blamed for conducting assassinations abroad of Iranians defined as enemies of the régime... The fight for power in Iran may resemble a gang war and if so Washington will have to keep its distance for a while.

Following the attempted assassination, the pro-Khatami group launched an unprecedented attack against the ruling faction, accusing it of preaching a culture of violence that led to the crime. One newspaper quoted an unnamed minister as saying that associates of Brigadier Mohammad-Reza Naqdi, The State Security Forces’ Counter-Intelligence chief, may have carried out the shooting. Another wrote: “...The assassination of Saeed Hajjarian is an attempt to start a war situation in Iran’s politics... A war situation quickly polarizes the society... What the organizers of terror will actually succeed in materializing will be preparing grounds for the destruction of the whole system...”.

While the pro-Khamenei press appealed for unity and blamed Mr. Hajjarian’s shooting on foreign enemies, some hard-line publications hit back. The weekly Yalesarat warned reformist commentators that they were “writing their wills” and told Mr Khatami to revise his cultural policies.

It was suspected from the start that the assassins were from the security forces. The motorcycle they used was of a type only the security forces are allowed to use.

IRNA reported “the gunman who shot Saeed Hajarian is a student at a Tehran university led by a top conservative”. Citing the head of the investigation, it named Saeed Asgar as the gunman responsible for the shooting.  The assassin was said to have been involved in attacks on students in last July’s unrest in Tehran. The Sobh-e Emrouz daily also claimed that Said Asgar and accomplices last year shot dead a girl, identified only as MM, “because they considered her behaviour unsuitable”.

Six arrests were officially announced, but the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF) said on March 23, in its own newspaper Mosharekat as well as Sobh-e Emrouz that the crime had been carried out by an unidentified  “military organisation”.

These reports, including the rumours about the involvement of members of the Guards Corps, promoted a vigorous reaction from Khamenei. In a letter to Khatami, the Supreme Leader ordered him to speed up inquiry into the cases of the chain murders and the attempted assassination of Hajjarian and to put an end to this subject. Khamenei “expressed concern about the prospect of national security and called for serious investigation of the serial murders case as well as the recent terrorist act. Khamenei said in the letter that last week’s assassination bid and certain peripheral issues had made him worry about future of national security. The supreme leader told the president to instruct the authoritative organs such as ministries of information and the interior as well as the Supreme National Security Council to expedite efforts with more seriousness to follow up the case and bring those involved to justice.

“Ayatollah Khamenei said the issue is likely to turn into an ambiguous and scandalous affair like the case of chain murders.  In the case of (chain) murders, although his Excellency commissioned delegations one after the other to follow up the case, failure to close the case led to rumors and created atmosphere of suspicion and ambiguity, regretted the leader.

“Ayatollah Khamenei said that in that (chain murders’) case, unfortunately, certain tongues and pens are seriously busy spreading rumors and escalating tension. They are not confined to the crimes alone but besides naming persons and individuals, they targeted even authoritative and reliable organs, even the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) and [paramilitary] Bassij forces, which are the most reliable bastions of national security, with false accusations. The leader questioned, ‘under such a tumultuous atmosphere, how can the judicial and security organs carry out their responsibilities with care and in a tranquil mood?’ Such ballyhoos have resulted in criminals’ occultation from the law with peace of mind, Ayatollah Khamenei added.  Ayatollah Khamenei said that he was not optimistic about the statements of those provoking such an atmosphere. ‘You had better commission officials to reach convincing results on the case [of the attempted assassination] in a definite time; in that case my anxiety and concern would subside,’ the leader said”.

President Khatami then  assigned Ali Younessi, the Intelligence Minister, Abdolvahed Moussavi-Lari, the Interior Minister, and Ebad (Ali Rabi’, ex-deputy Intelligence Minister and Khatami’s advisor on security affairs) to work hard to ease the Supreme Leader’s anxiety. “In pursuance of the leader’s verbal notifications, it is necessary to stress that speedy measures have to be taken to trace the origins of the catastrophe and to confront it”, said Khatami, adding that Mr Ebad should give necessary notices to the mass media in this regard.

Two days after Khamenei voiced concern about rumors linking the attack to the Revolutionary Guards, the Bassij  paramilitary group or their hardline allies, and following Khatami’s directive, restrictions were imposed on media reports on the attempt assassination. The Supreme National Security Council said that “any unreliable news, rumors and malicious analysis of the foreign media in connection with the arrests” should be avoided. “News...on the arrests of elements behind this terrorist act will be made available to the media by official sources,” the official IRNA news agency said. The prohibition was widely ignored, however, by the pro-Khatami press and politicians. The Vice-President for Women’s Affairs, Mrs Ma’soumeh Ebtekar said for instance that there were links between the attempt on Hajjarian’s life, the violent suppression of the student demonstrations in July 1999, and the chain murders.

The next vain effort to cover up the truth was the statement by the investigating team in the Ministry of Intelligence that the assassin said his motorcycle was privately-owned. Younessi said that the agents behind the assassination attempt were not affiliated to any group or guild.  He said the culprits had carried out the assassination attempt on their own and out of personal feelings and motivations. One member of the gang was jobless, another was a part-time worker in the guardhouse of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, who had been in the motorbike trade in his spare time and for the same reason had been deceived into the assassination attempt. The rest have been in private business. The level of the group’s education shows that they had perpetrated the killing attempt out of personal extremist feelings. Younessi said that a very old gun, an obsolete Makarov, had been used, a type not in the armoury of any security organization. He claimed that the 1000cc motorbike used by the killers was privately owned and that there were 1,500 individuals with such motorbikes.

These desperate attempts to lay down a smokescreen failed. It was widely reported that the killers belonged to the Intelligence Department of the Revolutionary Guards Corps. It was also claimed that Khamenei knew of the involvement of the Revolutionary Guards in the plot against Hajjarian, and it was for this reason he tried to impose a news blackout. The man who shot Hajjarian at close range, Saeed Asgar, was identified as the ringleader of the pro-Khamanei thugs who crushed the student demonstrations of July 1999. A number of papers carried photographs of him taken during the riots, carrying a placard on which the portrait of Khamanei was blanked out. It was Khamenei himself who ordered security forces and vigilantes to pulverise the students at any cost and by any means, and if Asgar faithfully executed his orders then, might not the Supreme Leader have given the orders this time as well? It was observed that the assassination of political opponents required the use of professional terrorists having a solid infrastructure and organisation, and links were made between the Hajjarian case, the violent onslaught on the students and the chain murders, as having the same authors.

In an unparalleled turn of speed, the court disposed of the charges arising out of the attempted killing of Hajjarian on May 17. Saeed Asgar was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Four other defendants, Mohsen Majidi, Mohammad Ali Moqaddami, Safar Maqsoudi and Ali Pour Chalu’i received between3 and 10 years imprisonment, and three other defendants were acquitted. The reason for this unwonted haste was to deny the Khatami faction the  opportunity of pressing for the identification of the religious authority who ordered the Revolutionary Guards to carry out this operation. Before being been closed on the orders of Khamenei in April, all the reformist and independent newspapers had been alleging that the killers were acting on the orders of the Intelligence Unit of the Revolutionary Guards, and the motive was to create chaos and provide the excuse for a declaration of a state of emergency, preparatory to a coup removing the President and installing Rafsanjani as the head of a provisional government.

The sentences were not commensurate with the offence, and the Islamic Iran Participation Front, (IIPF), Khatami’s party, criticised the proceedings, saying that no attempt had been made to find out who masterminded the shooting. It was also a matter of surprise that Asgar was to serve his sentence in Isfahan instead of Tehran’s Evin prison, where most serious offenders are held. The IIPF said that double standards in sentencing in a premeditated case of terrorism, would deal a heavy blow to confidence in the judicial system.