 On March 12, 2000, Saeed Hajjarian, a close
advisor of Khatami and member of the Tehran municipal council, was the
target of an attempted assassination. “Hajjarian is a former hard-liner
who founded the notorious Intelligence Ministry ”, and like most of
the reformers in the Iranian government including the President’s
brother, was one of the students who took over the United States
embassy in Tehran in 1979 . He served as a deputy minister before
leaving shortly before the new president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,
brought in his own security team in 1989.
No one claimed
responsibility for the attack. Within hours of the shooting, dozens of
security checkpoints were erected across Tehran and police were
checking motorcycles and cars. Intelligence Minister Ali Younessi said
the assailants had been identified.
In a speech in the
central province of Yazd, Khatami condemned the attackers as hated
“terrorists” who have “no place among the people”.
Khamenei
described the assassination as “part of a dangerous plot, which might
endanger the interests of the country, the people and the Islamic
system ”. The attempt on Saeed Hajjarian’s life may have signalled the
start of a new phase in the struggle within the Iranian establishment.
Up to that point it had been a war of words, but now for the first
time, the blood of an insider had been shed. Ali Rabi’i, secretary of
the Supreme National Security Council, Iran’s top security body, said,
“Those who chose Hajjarian to be their assassination target knew they
would create a crisis in the country by doing so”.
This
was a view shared by many observers. As one wrote, “After 21 stressful
years of living under clerical dictatorship, most Iranians would
happily settle for a more normal life. But last week... an assassin’s
bullet provided a shocking reminder of how grim and uncertain a
struggle may yet lie ahead.
The crime also prompted some
to admonish the US government not to get close to Tehran. “Recent
acts of political violence in Iran illuminate a fundamental uncertainty
haunting that strategically crucial country. The attempted
assassination of Saeed Hajjarian... suggests that the struggle for
power between hard-line clerics and reformers may not be settled by
peaceful, democratic means. In the early days of the Islamic republic,
he [Hajjarian] served as deputy intelligence minister, instituting a
secret service that has been blamed for conducting assassinations
abroad of Iranians defined as enemies of the régime... The fight for
power in Iran may resemble a gang war and if so Washington will have to
keep its distance for a while.
Following the attempted
assassination, the pro-Khatami group launched an unprecedented attack
against the ruling faction, accusing it of preaching a culture of
violence that led to the crime. One newspaper quoted an unnamed
minister as saying that associates of Brigadier Mohammad-Reza Naqdi,
The State Security Forces’ Counter-Intelligence chief, may have carried
out the shooting. Another wrote: “...The assassination of Saeed
Hajjarian is an attempt to start a war situation in Iran’s politics...
A war situation quickly polarizes the society... What the organizers of
terror will actually succeed in materializing will be preparing grounds
for the destruction of the whole system...”.
While the
pro-Khamenei press appealed for unity and blamed Mr. Hajjarian’s
shooting on foreign enemies, some hard-line publications hit back. The
weekly Yalesarat warned reformist commentators that they were “writing
their wills” and told Mr Khatami to revise his cultural policies.
It
was suspected from the start that the assassins were from the security
forces. The motorcycle they used was of a type only the security forces
are allowed to use.
IRNA reported “the gunman who shot
Saeed Hajarian is a student at a Tehran university led by a top
conservative”. Citing the head of the investigation, it named Saeed
Asgar as the gunman responsible for the shooting. The assassin
was said to have been involved in attacks on students in last July’s
unrest in Tehran. The Sobh-e Emrouz daily also claimed that Said Asgar
and accomplices last year shot dead a girl, identified only as MM,
“because they considered her behaviour unsuitable”.
Six
arrests were officially announced, but the Islamic Iran Participation
Front (IIPF) said on March 23, in its own newspaper Mosharekat as well
as Sobh-e Emrouz that the crime had been carried out by an
unidentified “military organisation”.
These
reports, including the rumours about the involvement of members of the
Guards Corps, promoted a vigorous reaction from Khamenei. In a letter
to Khatami, the Supreme Leader ordered him to speed up inquiry into the
cases of the chain murders and the attempted assassination of Hajjarian
and to put an end to this subject. Khamenei “expressed concern about
the prospect of national security and called for serious investigation
of the serial murders case as well as the recent terrorist act.
Khamenei said in the letter that last week’s assassination bid and
certain peripheral issues had made him worry about future of national
security. The supreme leader told the president to instruct the
authoritative organs such as ministries of information and the interior
as well as the Supreme National Security Council to expedite efforts
with more seriousness to follow up the case and bring those involved to
justice.
“Ayatollah Khamenei said the issue is likely to
turn into an ambiguous and scandalous affair like the case of chain
murders. In the case of (chain) murders, although his Excellency
commissioned delegations one after the other to follow up the case,
failure to close the case led to rumors and created atmosphere of
suspicion and ambiguity, regretted the leader.
“Ayatollah
Khamenei said that in that (chain murders’) case, unfortunately,
certain tongues and pens are seriously busy spreading rumors and
escalating tension. They are not confined to the crimes alone but
besides naming persons and individuals, they targeted even
authoritative and reliable organs, even the Islamic Revolution Guards
Corps (IRGC) and [paramilitary] Bassij forces, which are the most
reliable bastions of national security, with false accusations. The
leader questioned, ‘under such a tumultuous atmosphere, how can the
judicial and security organs carry out their responsibilities with care
and in a tranquil mood?’ Such ballyhoos have resulted in criminals’
occultation from the law with peace of mind, Ayatollah Khamenei
added. Ayatollah Khamenei said that he was not optimistic about
the statements of those provoking such an atmosphere. ‘You had better
commission officials to reach convincing results on the case [of the
attempted assassination] in a definite time; in that case my anxiety
and concern would subside,’ the leader said”.
President
Khatami then assigned Ali Younessi, the Intelligence Minister,
Abdolvahed Moussavi-Lari, the Interior Minister, and Ebad (Ali Rabi’,
ex-deputy Intelligence Minister and Khatami’s advisor on security
affairs) to work hard to ease the Supreme Leader’s anxiety. “In
pursuance of the leader’s verbal notifications, it is necessary to
stress that speedy measures have to be taken to trace the origins of
the catastrophe and to confront it”, said Khatami, adding that Mr Ebad
should give necessary notices to the mass media in this regard.
Two
days after Khamenei voiced concern about rumors linking the attack to
the Revolutionary Guards, the Bassij paramilitary group or their
hardline allies, and following Khatami’s directive, restrictions were
imposed on media reports on the attempt assassination. The Supreme
National Security Council said that “any unreliable news, rumors and
malicious analysis of the foreign media in connection with the arrests”
should be avoided. “News...on the arrests of elements behind this
terrorist act will be made available to the media by official sources,”
the official IRNA news agency said. The prohibition was widely ignored,
however, by the pro-Khatami press and politicians. The Vice-President
for Women’s Affairs, Mrs Ma’soumeh Ebtekar said for instance that there
were links between the attempt on Hajjarian’s life, the violent
suppression of the student demonstrations in July 1999, and the chain
murders.
The next vain effort to cover up the truth was
the statement by the investigating team in the Ministry of Intelligence
that the assassin said his motorcycle was privately-owned. Younessi
said that the agents behind the assassination attempt were not
affiliated to any group or guild. He said the culprits had
carried out the assassination attempt on their own and out of personal
feelings and motivations. One member of the gang was jobless, another
was a part-time worker in the guardhouse of the Islamic Revolution
Guards Corps, who had been in the motorbike trade in his spare time and
for the same reason had been deceived into the assassination attempt.
The rest have been in private business. The level of the group’s
education shows that they had perpetrated the killing attempt out of
personal extremist feelings. Younessi said that a very old gun, an
obsolete Makarov, had been used, a type not in the armoury of any
security organization. He claimed that the 1000cc motorbike used by the
killers was privately owned and that there were 1,500 individuals with
such motorbikes.
These desperate attempts to lay down a
smokescreen failed. It was widely reported that the killers belonged to
the Intelligence Department of the Revolutionary Guards Corps. It was
also claimed that Khamenei knew of the involvement of the Revolutionary
Guards in the plot against Hajjarian, and it was for this reason he
tried to impose a news blackout. The man who shot Hajjarian at close
range, Saeed Asgar, was identified as the ringleader of the
pro-Khamanei thugs who crushed the student demonstrations of July 1999.
A number of papers carried photographs of him taken during the riots,
carrying a placard on which the portrait of Khamanei was blanked out.
It was Khamenei himself who ordered security forces and vigilantes to
pulverise the students at any cost and by any means, and if Asgar
faithfully executed his orders then, might not the Supreme Leader have
given the orders this time as well? It was observed that the
assassination of political opponents required the use of professional
terrorists having a solid infrastructure and organisation, and links
were made between the Hajjarian case, the violent onslaught on the
students and the chain murders, as having the same authors.
In
an unparalleled turn of speed, the court disposed of the charges
arising out of the attempted killing of Hajjarian on May 17. Saeed
Asgar was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Four
other defendants, Mohsen Majidi, Mohammad Ali Moqaddami, Safar Maqsoudi
and Ali Pour Chalu’i received between3 and 10 years imprisonment, and
three other defendants were acquitted. The reason for this unwonted
haste was to deny the Khatami faction the opportunity of pressing
for the identification of the religious authority who ordered the
Revolutionary Guards to carry out this operation. Before being been
closed on the orders of Khamenei in April, all the reformist and
independent newspapers had been alleging that the killers were acting
on the orders of the Intelligence Unit of the Revolutionary Guards, and
the motive was to create chaos and provide the excuse for a declaration
of a state of emergency, preparatory to a coup removing the President
and installing Rafsanjani as the head of a provisional government.
The
sentences were not commensurate with the offence, and the Islamic Iran
Participation Front, (IIPF), Khatami’s party, criticised the
proceedings, saying that no attempt had been made to find out who
masterminded the shooting. It was also a matter of surprise that Asgar
was to serve his sentence in Isfahan instead of Tehran’s Evin prison,
where most serious offenders are held. The IIPF said that double
standards in sentencing in a premeditated case of terrorism, would deal
a heavy blow to confidence in the judicial system. |