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Thursday, 24 November 2005 |
 Some of the Intelligence Ministry agents now being used in the
propaganda campaign against the PMOI have committed murder or other
serious crimes against PMOI members. Qassem Salehi, for example, is one
of the individuals used by the Intelligence Ministry in Tehran to meet
with journalists and foreign visitors and pose as a former member of
the Mojahedin. He was an MOIS agent who was sent on a specific mission
to assassinate resistance officials.
He entered Iraq through Qasr-e Shirin border post in January 1998 with
the help of the Intelligence Ministry. On June 13, 1999, he shot dead
from behind PMOI member Mahmoud Agah in a bus terminal in Abadan. He
wounded two other members of the Mojahedin and several innocent
passengers and then went to the Intelligence Department. In subsequent
investigations, it was revealed that in 1992 he had murdered someone
and the MOIS gave him a choice to evade execution if he agreed to be
hired by them as a professional killer. He accepted and after a
six-year service in Iran, was sent on a murderous mission against the
PMOI.
Ali Qashqavi is another such case. Born in 1969 in Babol, northern
Iran, he went to Iraq through Turkey in 1993 and joined the NLA. He was
later discovered to be a member of Hezbollah since 1986. He admitted
that he had been briefed on his assignment to infiltrate the PMOI by
Haji Rezapour and Qorbanali Sadeqi at Babol Intelligence Department in
mid-1993. He was pardoned in May 1998 and later returned to Iran, where
the Intelligence Ministry is using him to intimidate the families of
PMOI members.
Abbas Sadeqi Nejad was an army lieutenant when he received his
instructions to infiltrate the PMOI on April 25, 1991. He was given the
assignment in a meeting in his native Malayer in western Iran attended
by the intelligence commander of the Revolutionary Guards, the
representative of Supreme Leader Khamenei in Malayer and several other
senior officials. His mission was to carry out a suicide attack against
the Mojahedin leadership, but he was uncovered by the NLA’s
counter-intelligence. He was detained for three months and then
released by the NLA to pursue his life in Iran, but he insisted to
remain. He wrote: “I was assigned by Ali-Mohammad Panji from the
Revolutionary Guards Corps on April 25, 1991. In the meeting where I
was assigned, Gholam Akbari, head of the intelligence, Manouchehr
Abedi, supreme leader’s representative in Malayer, Ali Fazelian, Friday
prayers leader at the time, Mansour Omid, Revolutionary Guards Corps
deputy and Reza Esmail-Pour, in charge of the Guards Corps supply in
extraterritorial operations were present. My assignment was to carry
out a suicide attack against the leadership of the People’s Mojahedin
Organization using hand grenade or TNT which had to be procured
locally. To avoid any leak, I was supposed to go for it on my own and
plan for necessary supplies and the operation on the scene. The
location for operation was to be one of the general meetings.”
On April 17, 2001, Sadeqi Nejad received a coded letter together with a
message from his wife from Iran. In June 2002, he stole a vehicle, some
money and equipment and fled to Iran through the Jalawla region. He has
also been used by the MOIS since his return to make propaganda against
the Mojahedin.
Adham Tayyebi, another MOIS agent, attempted to murder a Mojahedin
member, Hamid Arbab, as he tried to make his getaway to Iran in
December 2001. After stealing a car and a weapon, he went to Iraqi
Kurdistan and, with the help of Intelligence Ministry agents in that
area, went to Iran. He went to Tehran via Baneh and Saqez.
The Intelligence Ministry dispatched him to Europe after he was
debriefed and received instructions on his new mission. Tayyebi is now
introducing himself as “the head of production, and program presenter
of the Resistance’s satellite emission,” while the fact is that he
played the role of an actor in TV comedy programs during the time he
was in the border region in a PMOI base.
The MOIS agents mentioned in this chapter are but a few of the many who
are being used by the Iranian regime in a variety of ways either in its
propaganda campaign to smear the PMOI and the NCRI or to facilitate or
conduct its terrorist plots. It must be noted, however, that the
freedom of action enjoyed by the Intelligence Ministry’s spies,
terrorists and agents against the Iranian Resistance and refugees in
Europe is a direct consequence of a misguided policy that places trade
and short-term interests ahead of political and ethical principles.
While MOIS agents roam freely in these countries, the masterminds and
perpetrators of the murders of dozens of Iranian dissidents on European
soil have yet to face justice.
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