|
In 1998, the Iranian public was horrified and amazed by the brutal murders of numerous prominent intellectuals, later to be described in the Iranian media as the “chain murders”, Iran Terror has learnt. |
|
|
Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) were directly involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups, especially Palestinian groups with leadership cadres in Syria and Lebanese Hizballah, to use terrorism in pursuit of their goals. In addition, the IRGC was increasingly involved in supplying lethal assistance to Iraqi militant groups, which destabilizes Iraq. |
|
|
Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2001. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) continued to be involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts and supported a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals. |
|
Despite the victory for moderates in Iran's Majles elections in February, aggressive countermeasures by hardline conservatives have blocked most reform efforts. Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2000.
|
|
 Early in the year 2000, after the escalation of activities of the
agents of MOIS in various western countries, the police in these
countries interviewed many of them and warned them against their
relations with the mullahs’ Ministry of Intelligence. At the same, time
Karim Haghi issued a statement under the name of a society called
"Peyvand" (an association established by agents of Ministry of
Intelligence in The Netherlands). Excerpts of the statement follow:
|
|
 The German security agency, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Bfv, wrote in its 2005 annual report (released 17 May 2005):
Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has several opposition groups under surveillance in Europe.
|
|
|
The German security agency, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Bfv, wrote in its 2002 annual report:
The exiled opposition in Germany is still in the core of the surveillance activity of Iran’s secret service, MOIS… MOIS, at present, is apparently focusing on defusing the opposition groups and their political activity. In this respect MOIS resorts to leading and financing propaganda against the opposition including those voiced by previous opponents of the regime. Like previous years Iran’s secret service tries to enlist active or ex- members of opposition groups. This, in many instances, is taking place with intimidation of them or their families who are living in Iran.
|
|
|
The Dutch Interior Security Service (BVD), in its 2001 annual report, wrote:
Including in the duties of MOIS is the tracing and recognition of persons who have contacts with the opposition groups abroad. Supporters of the most important group i.e. Mojahedin-e Khalgh, are more then anyone else, and particularly, subject of attention of Iran’s secret service. The Ministry of Intelligence tries to collect as much information about this organization as possible through “ex-members of the Mojahedin”. Also, the agents of MOIS are instructed to distribute negative information about PMOI and its members. In this way, they attempt to weaken the organization and, in order to end their social and political movements, strive to portray a satanic view of the Mojahedin in host countries.
|
|
|
The German security agency, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Bfv, wrote in its 2000 annual report:
The Iranian opposition in exile in Germany is in the core of the surveillance activities of MOIS. Various organizations and groups … are systematically under surveillance and scrutiny of this service. Yet the principal target is the most active and the most militarized opposition group… the PMOI and its political wing the NCRI who is working in an international level.
|
|
|
The Dutch Interior Security Service (BVD), in its 2000 annual report, wrote:
Iranian statesmen act harshly against the opposition groups. Most of their attention is directed towards ex-supporters of PMOI.
Iran’s secret service administers its tasks not only under cover of usual diplomatic means but also increasingly from inside of Iran. In this respect, they use secret service officers and those living abroad. These agents must attack and harm the Iranian opposition instantly.
|
|
|
The German security agency, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Bfv, wrote in its 1999 annual report:
The principal objective of the Iranian secret service is still to fight the Iranian oppositionists. … the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) and its political wing, the NCRI, are still at the top of the Intelligence Ministry’s activities. To grapple against the activities of the opposition in exile, Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has established various cultural associations. These are cover agencies that work for MOIS and the Iranian regime. Other than this, MOIS tries to publish various publications, some in the name of those who introduce themselves as ex-members of the PMOI, in order to persuade the reader to retract from the organization.
|
|
|
|
